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Abstract
Based on an intertermporal entry model of the physician market,
we analyze how the supply of o¢ ce-based physicians depends on re-
gional character and on the age-structure of the local population as
determinants of the current protability of physician services, on local
population change as a predictor of future demand, and on the extent
of equilibrium adjustment within local markets. Using German re-
gional data, we nd that the number of general practitioners (GPs)
per capita is positively related to the share of the population 60 and
above within metropolitan areas, but negatively within rural areas.
Future changes in list size have an impact on the current supply of
GPs, suggesting limitations to equilibrium adjustment especially in
regions with excess supply. Overall, population change should have
raised the protability of GP services over the period 19972008. The
falling supply of GPs, especially in rural regions, then implies an in-
crease in reservation income.
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1 Introduction
Population ageing is widely expected to come with an increased per-capita
demand for ambulatory physician services. According to a popular argument
regions with high population shares of elderly persons should then be par-
ticularly protable for physician practice and should therefore exhibit a high
number of physicians per capita.1 This view contrasts with recent evidence
from Germany according to which rural regions with large elderly popula-
tions are in danger of being under-doctored. In these regions, ageing may
lead to a widening gap between the demand for health care and its supply, a
situation potentially warranting policy intervention (Advisory Council 2014).
Similar concerns have been raised in other countries, e.g. in the US (Cooper
et al. 2002, Colwill et al 2008).
The question under what conditions and in which geographical context
the health care needs of an ageing population can be adequately covered
adds a new dimension to a long-standing debate on regional imbalances in
the distribution of physicians.2 In Germany, this debate has seen a turn of
the tide during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Set against the general view
of ubiquitous over-supply, at least in western Germany, concerns have been
increasing over the last decade about physician shortages in rural regions,
most notably but not exclusively in eastern Germany. While in the time
span 19952009, the total number of o¢ ce-based physicians has continued
to increase by some 27 percent, there has been considerable geographical
variation in this trend with a large number of regions losing physicians. At
the same time, the number of general practitioners (GPs) has been falling
by some 7 percent on average, the decline being much more pronounced in
rural regions, where GPs are often the sole providers of medical services.
1Frequently, the number of physicians per capita is referred to as "physician den-
sity". We refrain from this terminology in order to avoid confusion with the measure of
"population density", which we will also be referring to.
2Recent contributions include Ono et al. (2014) for the OECD; Fülöp et al. (2008)
and Gächter et al. (2012) for Austria; Hann and Gravelle (2004), Elliott et al. (2006) and
Goddard et al. (2010) for England (and Wales); Fülöp et al. (2008), Klose and Rehbein
(2011), Scholz et al. (2015), Sundmacher and Ozegowski (2016) and Vogt (2016) for
Germany; Iversen and Kopperud (2005) for Norway; Correia and Veiga (2010) for Portugal;
Nocera and Wanzenried (2008) for Switzerland; Cooper et al. (2002) and Rosenthal et al.
(2005) for the US.
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Indeed, the concern about an increasingly unequal geographical distribution
in the access to primary health care and about the ensuing health outcomes
such as avoidable cancer deaths (Sundmacher and Busse 2011) or avoidable
hospitalizations (Sundmacher and Kopetsch 2015) has been at the heart of
recent health care reforms (Ozegowski and Sundmacher 2012, 2014; Advisory
Council 2014). Ono et al. (2014) summarize similar policy concerns for a
number of OECD countries.
It is the aim of this study to identify some of the relationships underlying
the development of the geographic distribution of physicians and, in partic-
ular, to understand the role of regional population change. We construct
an overlapping-generations model in which physicians commit to a practice
location when young and then provide services to the local population over
their working lives. Determining within entry equilibrium the number of
physicians per capita within a region, we show how the regional supply of
physicians depends on the stream of current and anticipated practice income
and, thus, how it depends on the current and future demographic make-up,
as measured by the age structure and size of the population. From the entry
equilibrium condition we then derive a structural equation, allowing us to for-
mulate and test in a theory-grounded way a number of hypotheses about the
determinants of physician supply at the regional level. Our analysis points
at three particularly relevant issues when it comes to assessing the impact
on physician supply of regional population change. Each of these suggests
that the view that regions with large elderly populations are attractive for
physicians may be too simplistic.
First, the protability of o¤ering services to di¤erent age groups of the
population does not only vary with the demand by these groups but also
with the prot margin earned on each patient. If reimbursement rates are
only imperfectly adjusted to di¤erences in treatment costs and if the treat-
ment of older patients is more costly, then it is no longer clear that a larger
share of elderly patients automatically raises prot. Hence, the design of
the reimbursement system is bound to matter. Furthermore, it is likely that
the sensitivity of treatment costs and demand with respect to age varies sys-
tematically with the regional circumstances. For instance, long travelling
distances and poor availability of public transport within rural as opposed to
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urban settings may render the treatment of elderly and frail patients more
costly, both as more home visits are required and as rendering such visits is
more costly for the physician. Thus, we expect the relative protability of
di¤erent age groups to vary with the position of a region on the urbanrural
spectrum as well as with the extent to which the reimbursement system is
accounting for such variation.
Second, as physicians typically set up their location for a long period in
many instances for the remainder of their working lives their location choice
should not only reect current but also future prot opportunities. With
expectations about the future demand for services being linked to population
change, regions that experience population growth may attract physicians in
excess of the number that would be supported by the current size of the
population. Conversely, in regions with a shrinking population the number
of physicians may fall short of the number that would be supported by the
current population.
Third, the extent to which the future income stream bears on the cur-
rent supply of physicians depends on how far the process of exit and entry
leads to an adjustment in the number of physicians towards its equilibrium
value. We show that under instantaneous adjustment to equilibrium, the
number of physicians per capita is determined exclusively by current income,
whereas future demographic development does not bear on the current supply
of physicians. This is because changes in income are fully o¤set by compen-
sating changes in the number of rivalling physicians. Thus, regardless of the
future size and protability of the regional market, a physicians remaining
life-cycle income corresponds to the (reservation) value that is necessary for
physicians to locate within that region. In contrast, if the local supply of
physicians does not fully adjust towards its equilibrium value, then the cur-
rent number of physicians per capita depends on future demand and income
as long as the market is expected to be out of equilibrium. Reasons for a lack
of adjustment towards equilibrium may be regulatory entry restrictions and
the presence of sunk costs, leading to entry and exit barriers, respectively.
Given the presence of entry regulation at regional level in Germany, we seek
to establish empirically whether or not this leads to a substantive lack in
equilibrium adjustment in local physician markets.
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We use panel data for Germany at the regional level to examine empir-
ically the relationship between local physician supply and its demographic
and geographic determinants. Using annual data for 409 districts for the
period 19952009, we analyze how the population share of individuals aged
60 and above (60plus) and the share of individuals aged 19 and below (19mi-
nus) a¤ect the local supply of physicians. In our estimations, we focus on
GPs as a large and homogeneous sub-group of o¢ ce-based physicians, with
at least some GPs operating in all regions. Moreover, GPs typically provide
services to a local population, implying that inter-regional patient ows are
of little relevance. We control for regional characteristics which, according
to the literature, are relevant for the geographical distribution of physician
practices.
Using a xed-e¤ects panel data estimator, we analyze how the number of
GPs per capita depends on the age structure and growth of the population as
well as on the presence of regulatory entry ceilings. Our results show that the
impact of the age structure on the supply of physicians depends on whether
or not a region is urban. Most prominently, the share of the population
60plus has a positive impact on GP supply within metropolitan areas but a
negative impact within rural areas. Expectations about future demography,
as measured by the growth rate of the list size, i.e. the number of residents
served by each physician within the region, in the year subsequent to the cur-
rent year of observation, have an economically small impact on the current
number of GPs per capita. While this hints at some imperfections in equi-
librium adjustment in general, we also show that these e¤ects are stronger
in regions for which an "excess supply" has been established and which are
therefore likely to be subject to entry ceilings. We also nd conrming ev-
idence for the notion that greater population density (across space) tends
to induce stronger competition, leading ceteris paribus to a lower number of
GPs per capita (Gravelle 1999, Nuscheler 2003), as well as for the substitute
relationship between GPs and internists (Newhouse et al. 1982).
Based on our estimations, we employ a decomposition analysis to study
the drivers behind the decline in the supply of GPs in Germany over the pe-
riod 19972008. We nd that population ageing itself would have supported
an increase in supply in both urban and rural regions. In rural regions, this
5
  
e¤ect is enhanced further by the reduction in population density, leading to
a decline in competition. While these impacts are dampened by a concomi-
tant increase in the supply of internists, we nd that overall the decline in
the number of GPs per capita can only be explained by an increase in their
reservation income. This speaks to a (relative) decline in the attractiveness
of working in general practice, especially in rural regions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
surveys the related literature, while Section 3 o¤ers a brief introduction into
the institutional (Section 3.1) and demographic (Section 3.2) context of the
provision of GP services in Germany over the time frame 19952009. In Sec-
tion 4.1 we then develop and solve a theoretical model of regional physician
supply, which we employ in Section 4.2 to derive the structural equation and
hypotheses. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis, including a descrip-
tion of the data in Section 5.1, our main regression analysis based on di¤erent
specications in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, and a decomposition of the change in
GP supply based on our empirical ndings in Section 5.4. Conclusions are
o¤ered in Section 6. Appendix A contains some formal derivations; Appendix
B contains additional estimations for robustness, employing absolute num-
bers of GPs as dependent variable; and Appendix C contains the gures and
tables we refer to.
2 Literature
The literature on the geographic distribution of physicians is predominantly
empirical and somewhat eclectic in terms of the modelling approach. New-
house et al. (1982) examine the location patterns of US physicians by re-
gressing the probability of having at least one practice of a given specialty on
the size of the town/community. As expected, larger towns are more likely to
attract a practitioner within any given specialty. As more specialized physi-
cians require larger catchment areas, they are more prone to settle in larger
cities. In turn, this implies that GPs are over-represented in rural areas,
where the substitute services of internists are less available. These location
patterns have been conrmed by Dionne et al. (1987) for Canadian data, and
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by Rosenthal et al. (2005) for more recent US data.3 Their results show that
population growth has triggered a di¤usion, albeit incomplete, of specialists
into more rural areas. While the analytical approach and the results of these
studies are well in line with location theory, they are essentially (compara-
tive) static in nature and do not examine the role of population structure or
population ows.
A number of studies regress the number of physicians per capita within a
certain region on a set of demographic, geographic and economic covariates.
The ndings with regard to age structure are somewhat mixed. Using cross-
sectional data from Switzerland, Kraft and von der Schulenburg (1986) nd a
positive yet insignicant impact of the population share 55 and above. Using
cross-sectional data from Germany, Kopetsch (2007) and Jürges (2007) nd
a signicantly positive impact of the population share 50 and above and 65
and above, respectively.4 These ndings are conrmed by Sundmacher and
Ozegowski (2016) in separate estimations for GPs and specialists. Finally,
Correia and Veiga (2010) nd a very small positive impact of the ageing rate
on regional GP supply in Portugal.
In contrast, Hingstman and Boon (1989) identify a signicant negative
e¤ect of the share of the elderly population on the number of GPs per capita
at the regional level within the Netherlands. There, GPs are reimbursed
a capitation for each publicly insured patient. This turns elderly people
into relatively unprotable patients as high treatment intensities have to be
nanced out of a xed budget per patient. Goddard et al. (2010) estimate
the regional physician supply per capita for the UK, using separate cross-
sections for 2002 and 2006. They nd a negative e¤ect of mean-age, once an
IV-estimator is used to address the endogeneity of morbidity. While higher
levels of morbidity increase the supply of physicians, older patients may be
unattractive prospects nevertheless, as for given levels of morbidity they are
potentially more costly to treat.
3See also Newhouse (1990) for an intermediatefollow-up with US data.
4See also Breyer et al. (1986) for an early study on physician supply in Germany.
All of these studies estimate physician supply as integral part of an analysis of supplier-
induced demand. Breyer et al. (1986) and Kraft and von der Schulenburg (1986) estimate
physician supply per capita jointly with measures of expenditure and treatment intensity.
Kopetsch (2007) and Jürges (2007) estimate physician supply per capita as an instrument
to be used in the estimation of treatment intensity.
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The cross-sectional nature of these studies exposes them to the potential
problem of unobserved regional heterogeneity. Moreover, it poorly reects
the intertemporal nature of the market for physician services with respect
to the evolution of demand.5 These issues are to some degree addressed in
Foster and Gorr (1992), Nocera and Wanzenried (2008) and Gächter et al.
(2012), who provide panel data estimations of physician supply for US states,
Swiss cantons and Austrian districts, respectively. Nocera and Wanzenried
(2008) nd that population growth lowers the growth of GP supply but raises
the growth of specialist supply, a result that is in line with the argument in
Newhouse et al. (1982). However, as the estimation does not directly control
for the development of specialist supply when estimating the growth of the
number of GPs per capita (and vice versa), it cannot disentangle the pure
e¤ect of population growth from the change in competition. Gächter et al.
(2012) provide evidence on the interrelationship between private and public
GPs and specialists, but none of the studies includes the age structure of the
population.
The studies reviewed so far do not develop the estimation framework from
the equilibrium condition for physician entry at the regional level. This is
only done in Schaumans and Verboven (2008) who extend the Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991) model of industry entry to study the complementary relationship
between physicians and pharmacies. From the static Nash entry equilibrium
they derive structural equations for the probability of certain market con-
gurations, depending on regional market conditions. In their estimation,
which is again based on cross-sectional data, they identify a positive impact
of the share 65 and above on physician entry.6
5Correia and Veiga (2010) and Goddard et al. (2010) also provide estimations in dif-
ferences between two survey years. Correia and Veiga (2010) identify a negative impact of
population growth on the growth rate of the per-capita number of GPs, whereas Goddard
et al. (2010) nd no signicant e¤ects for their candidate variables.
6Hurley (1991) and Bolduc et al. (1996) provide microeconometric analyses of physi-
cianschoices of their practice location but do not consider the regional population struc-
ture as a determinant.
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3 Physician Supply and Population Change
in Germany 19952009
While the relationships between population change, regional structure and
physician supply we derive from our theoretical model are entirely general
per se, they are importantly shaped by the institutional setting. This is
particularly pertinent when it comes to deriving hypotheses on the directions
of the relationship between population change and changes in the supply of
physicians. We therefore start with a brief introduction into the provision
of ambulatory health care (Section 3.1) and population change (Section 3.2)
in Germany over the time span 19952009 as the context of our empirical
analysis.
3.1 Supply of O¢ ce-Based Physicians in Germany
In Germany, the group of o¢ ce-based physicians comprises GPs and spe-
cialists (e.g. for internal medicine, gynaecology, ophthalmology, paediatry,
orthopaedics, etc.). The large majority of physicians working in ambulatory
care are a¢ liated with the statutory health insurance (SHI), covering about
88 percent of the German population. In 2003, SHI-a¢ liated physicians
(panel doctors) made up for 117,600 out of 132,400 o¢ ce-based physicians,
i.e. for around 89 percent (Busse and Riesberg 2004). The share of GPs
amongst all o¢ ce-based physicians was around 35 percent in 2002.7 About
75 percent of o¢ ce-based physicians work single-handed.8
The payment for services delivered by ambulatory physicians, including
GPs, to SHI-patients is determined in two steps. Initially, sickness funds al-
locate a negotiated budget to the physician association(s) at the state (Bun-
desländer) level. In turn, the physician association(s) allocate (notional)
budgets to physician practices contingent on the number of patients in the
7According to data of the Association of SHI Physicians (Kassenärztliche Bundesvere-
inigung) the share of SHI-a¢ liated physicians amongst all family physicians (of which GPs
form a substantial part) was 95 percent in 2008. We believe this to be indicative of the
share of SHI-a¢ liated GPs.
8For further information on the physician workforce and details of the reimbursement
scheme see Busse and Riesberg (2004) and Busse and Blümel (2014).
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previous year. Services are then reimbursed on a fee for service basis ac-
cording to a schedule ("Uniform Value Scale") determined at federal level.9
One notable feature of the German fee for service system is that once the
total volume of reimbursable services has reached a pre-determined budget,
any further provision will lead to a proportional reduction in the fee (on all
services) such that total payments do not exceed the ceiling.10 As Busse
and Riesberg (2004) report, this has led to almost constant payments per
case and per physician despite a sizeable increase in both cases and physi-
cians over the time span 19952001.11 Ambulatory physicians also provide
services to the 9 percent of the population with private health insurance.
While the remuneration for private patients is typically more generous, the
fee structure reects the one of SHI, yet without budget ceilings. Leaving
further details of the payment process aside, two things are worthy of note
in regard to reimbursement during the time span 19952009 covered by our
data:
Observation 1 (i) Fees for service are typically neither adjusted for age nor
for other patient characteristics.12 (ii) While SHI fees may vary across states
(Bundesländer), they apply uniformly across all districts (Kreise) within each
state, the latter being the geographic unit of observation in our study.
Patients are free to choose between physicians within each speciality, and
although they are encouraged to attend a GP for an initial consultation,
there is no strict gatekeeping, implying they can directly access specialists.13
9Notably, around 21 percent of SHI revenue results from a quarterly "basic fee" per
patient that is tantamount to a capitation component.
10Initially, budget ceilings were xed at the level of the regional physician association,
which led to a Cournot-type competition of physicians generating an excess incentive to
provide services at the expense of a declining price for all, the so so-called "tread-mill e¤ect"
(Benstetter and Wambach 2006). From 1997 onwards, budget ceilings were imposed at
practice level. While this helped to curb the treadmill e¤ect it also generated an incentive
for physicians to shift provision to the privately insured who were not subject to the ceiling
(Schmitz 2013).
11Busse and Riesberg (2004, Table 32) report an average SHI reimbursement of 171,700
e per GP (236,900 e per internist), which after the deduction of costs leaves a sur-
plus/income of 77,265 e (95,944 e) in 2001.
12This excludes the capitation component, which depends on whether or not the patient
is retired.
13In 2004, a 10 e consultation fee was introduced that was payable at the rst con-
sultation with a specic physician within a quarter, consultations upon a referral as well
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Indeed, in 1998 around 48 percent of insureds with a large statutory health
insurer (AOK) directly consulted a specialist (RKI 2008). Furthermore, for
general health care, the age group 017 mostly turn to paediatricians even
if gradually shifting to GPs with advancing adolescence (Kamtsiuris et al.
2007). From the perspective of GPs, this implies the following:
Observation 2 (i) With respect to the adult population GPs are in direct
competition with specialists for internal medicine (internists), especially if
these practise as "family doctors". (ii) The non-adult population (aged 1-17)
will contribute relatively little to GPsincome.
In principle, panel doctors are free to chose their practice location. Since
1993, however, entry regulations apply at the level of physician specialty,
including general practice. These regulations are based on the criterion of
"excess supply", which up until 2009 was established for a specialty within
a district if the respective number of physicians per capita exceeded 110
percent of a benchmark value. The latter corresponded to the 1990 (for
GPs and family internists: 1995) number of physicians per capita within
this specialty averaged across districts of the same classication.14 Districts
for which an excess supply has been established are generally closed to new
entries within the relevant specialty but not to replacements. The opening
of a new practice may be granted only if a special need is asserted. While
in 2003 a vast majority of districts (typically around 90 percent and more)
were classied as exhibiting excess supply for most medical specialties, only
34 percent of districts were classied as exhibiting excess supply for GPs and
family internists (Busse and Riesberg 2004). Notably, the numbers of most
specialist physicians continued to increase over the 1990s and 2000s despite
the almost complete closure of the market that one would expect based on the
criterion of excess supply. This suggests a widespread lack of enforcement.
as follow-up consultations with the same physician being free of charge. Evidence on the
extent to which this scheme reduced physician visits is mixed (e.g. Schreyögg and Grabka
2010, Farbmacher and Winter 2013).
14Notably, this denition was unrelated to patient need, however dened. Neither was it
relating to the physician supply within neighbouring regions. See Fülöp et al. (2008, 2010),
Klose and Rehbein (2011) and Busse and Blümel (2014) for a more detailed discussion of
the German system of entry regulation. The denition of excess supply was altered in the
course of a health care reform in 2011, i.e. outside our study period.
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We can summarize as follows.
Observation 3 Although many districts are classied as exhibiting an "ex-
cess supply" of physicians, (i) this is much less frequently the case for GPs,
and (ii) it does not always result in a binding entry restriction.
We conclude this section by pointing out a number of changes in the
course of health care reforms enacted in 2007 and 2011 (see Busse and Blümel
2014). The rst reform provided that from 2009 onwards, the overall bud-
get granted at state level is adjusted for the morbidity of the population and
certain regional features, and that volumes of (reimbursable) services are cal-
culated at practice level. The 2011 reform implied changes (i) to the mode of
reimbursement, granting greater regional autonomy and introducing various
nancial and regulatory measures to render rural practice more attractive;
and (ii) to the regulation of entry closures, where the share of the popula-
tion 65+ is now taken into account when determining "need" at district level
(Ozegowski and Sundmacher 2012). This reform obviously had no impact on
the development of physician supply over our study period.
3.2 Population Change and the Supply of General Prac-
titioners
In the following, we describe some of the salient trends in the supply of GPs
at regional level over our period of observation, 19952009. We contrast the
supply trends against the regional population change over the same time
span. The regional INKAR dataset we are employing covers 412 districts
(Kreise), corresponding to NUTS III level, as our spatial unit of observation.
Districts can be classied into three broad categories: metropolitan districts
(type I), municipalized districts (type II), and rural districts (type III).15
Over the time span 19952009, Germany has witnessed an increase by
27 percent in the total number of o¢ ce-based physicians (including GPs),
while the number of GPs has decreased by about 7 percent. These trends
exhibit large variation at district level. Figure 1 provides information on the
percentage change in the number of physicians and GPs between 1995 and
15We refer the reader to Section 5.1 for a more detailed description of the data.
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2009 at district level. While for most districts the number of all physicians
exhibits positive growth, the opposite is true for GPs. The latter nding
applies in particular to eastern Germany, but also to some rural districts
in western Germany. At the same time, some districts in western Germany
have experienced an unabated increase in the supply of all physicians and
GPs alike.
Figure 1 about here
This begs the question as to what are the causes for these divergent supply
trends. One candidate explanation relates to population change, where rural
areas have experienced a rapidly shrinking population and a strong increase
in the mean age over the observation period. Especially in eastern Germany,
the decline in population size has been driven by strong outmigration of
young people into metropolitan areas in western Germany that o¤er better
employment prospects.
Population change could potentially a¤ect physician supply through two
channels: changes in the age structure of the population and changes in its
size. Figure 2 shows that the population share 19minus is negatively cor-
related both with the population share 60plus ( 0:67) and with the share
2059 ( 0:31). Similarly, the population share 60plus is negatively corre-
lated with the population share 2059 ( 0:49):While the share 19minus has
decreased by 3.35 percent from 1995 to 2009, the population share 60plus
has increased by 5.25 percent during the same period. Hence, the population
share 2059 declined by about 1.9 percent. This is consistent with an ageing
population. At the same time, the overall population size declined by about
1 percent.
Figure 2 about here
As Table 2 shows, the three types of districts (metropolitan, municipal-
ized, rural) di¤er in respect to the nature and speed of population change
and in respect to the development of the supply of GPs. While the number
of GPs per capita is increasing with the level of rurality, a result which is in
line with Newhouse et al. (1982), the number of GPs per square kilometer is
13
  
decreasing. This is consistent as population density declines even more with
rurality. The number of GPs has been in decline over our observation pe-
riod both per capita and per square kilometer, the decline in numbers being
weakest in metropolitan districts.
While the population share 60plus is increasing with rurality by a modest
amount, the municipalized districts exhibit the largest share 19minus. Pop-
ulation ageing, as measured by a simultaneous increase in the share 60plus
and a decrease in the share 19minus, is manifest across districts of all types.
The extent of ageing is most pronounced within rural areas.
Table 2 about here
4 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we develop a theoretical model of entry into a regional physi-
cian market in order to determine the number of physicians per capita within
entry equilibrium. Based on this, we derive a structural equation, allowing
us to regress for each region and at each point in time the per-capita number
of physicians on the age structure of the population, on the degree of rurality,
on the growth of average list size, on an indicator for entry restrictions, as
well as on a set of control variables.
We begin by specifying a physicians income. For this purpose, we focus
on some arbitrary region characterized by a time-invariant index of "rurality"
r. The resident population of size `t at time t can be decomposed into three
age groups, indexed by a = 1; 2; 3: Specically, we let a = 1 correspond to
the young age group (19minus), a = 2 to the middle age group (2059), and
a = 3 to the group of the elderly (60plus). Denoting by `at the size of age
group a at time t; we obtain `t =
P
a `
a
t as population size at time t and can
then dene the age shares at := `
a
t =`t. For notational convenience we will
write 1t = t 2 [0; 1] and 3t = t 2 [0; 1] so that 2t = 1  t   t 2 [0; 1].
We dene y (a; r) as a measure of expected income from the provision
of ambulatory health care to a resident belonging to age group a within a
14
  
type-r region and assume16
y (a; r)  0: (A1)
Employing the age shares, we obtain
yt = y
 
t; t; t; r

:=
X
a
y (a; r)at t
=

y (2; r) + [y (3; r)  y (2; r)]t + [y (1; r)  y (2; r)]t
	
t (1)
as the income a physician expects to earn per resident within the region in
year t. Here, we use t to denote a time-variant income shifter, a¤ecting
either the demand for the physicians services and/or their protability. We
defer a more concrete denition of t to further on below [see assumption
(A8) in Sub-section 4.2], and merely note at this stage that t may measure
e.g. the availability of substitute medical services, the intensity of compe-
tition, regional income and non-age-related compositional measures of the
population within the region.17 Using nt to denote the number of physicians
practising within the region in year t and assuming that physicians serve the
local population symmetrically across space and across age groups, we can
write a physicians expected period income as yt (`t=nt) = yt (nt=`t)
 1, where
`t=nt is the (potential) list size of a representative physician in year t:18
4.1 Entry Equilibrium
In light of empirical evidence indicating a low geographical mobility of prac-
titioners once they have settled within a particular region (Taylor and Leese
1998, Elliott et al. 2006, Kopetsch and Munz 2007, Correia and Veiga 2010),
16This implies either that physicians are able to cross-subisidize the provision of un-
protable services within each age group or, alternatively, that they are able to reduce the
intensity of service provision to a level at which they at least break even.
17In our estimation t will be a measure of a number of time-varying control variables
for any particular region within our dataset. Thus, t measures "regional development"
rather than "regional type", as the time-invariant index r does.
18Noting that the potential list-size is just the inverse of the number of physicians per
capita, nt=`t, we see that our relationship is consistent with the negative relationship
between the supply of GPs per capita and their income that is identied in Dormont and
Samson (2008).
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the opening of a physician practice can be viewed as a long-term decision.19
When considering the establishment of a practice, a physician would there-
fore not only assess the income from the provision of services to the current
population, but also the income she expects from the provision of services in
the future.
Consider thus a set-up where a representative physician practises for two
periods after which she retires or leaves the region/profession for other rea-
sons. In Appendix A1, we set out a more general model in which physicians
work for 1 + z, with z  1; periods. We derive our key result (as phrased
in Proposition 1) for the general model and show that the two-period case
corresponds to the special case z = 1:
For the moment, we focus on the physicians life-cycle problem within a
single region. Applying a discount factor  < 1, we can write the present
value of the physicians expected life-cycle income at the time of entry, t; as
vt = yt
`t
nt
+ E

yt+1
`t+1
nt+1

where ybt = y  bt; bt; bt; r, as given by (1), is the average income per resi-
dent in period bt 2 ft; t+ 1g and where `bt=nbt is the potential list size.20 The
expectations operator for period t+ 1 corresponds to the uncertainty about
whether or not the supply of physicians adjusts to its equilibrium value, as
described in greater detail below.
Denoting by ut = but + but+1 a non-monetary life-cycle benet from re-
19Unfortunately, there is little data on the average duration of a physicians spell within
one specic practice. Elliot et al. (2006) report an average migration rate of 0.012 and an
average exit rate of 0.048, adding up to an average turnover rate of 0.06, for GP principals
in the UK (year 2003). One issue is that the exit rate includes GPs who enter retirement
at the end of their professional life. Combining, thus, the average data in Elliot et al.
(2006) with age-specic data on the quitting intentions of English GP principals (year
2001), as reported in Sibbald et al. (2003), one can impute the age structure of actual exit
(calculations are available upon request). Based on this, we obtain an expected tenure
within a single practice of about 20 years for GP principals in the UK. About 75 percent
of the German GPs we are considering work as single-handed principals, and we would
presume them to be subject to broadly comparable incentives.
20The important role of income in driving a physicians location choice has been es-
tablished e.g. by Hurley (1991) and by Bolduc et al. (1996) who nd (average) income
elasticities of 1.05 and 1.11, respectively.
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siding in the region, we assume a physicians expected life-cycle utility to be
given by21
wt = vtut: (2)
Furthermore, let wt denote a physicians outside utility at the time t of
entering the profession/region and dene
vt := wtu
 1
t (3)
as the income required by a physician to take up practice within the particular
region. The value of this reservation income increases in the outside utility
wt and decreases in the "residential" value of a region ut:
Within our geographic setting, physicians choose a location from a set
of I regions, indexed by i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig. In order to guarantee analytical
tractability, we assume (i) that patient mobility across regions is too low
as to generate signicant cross-regional market overlap, and (ii) that the
total number of regions is so large that aggregate physician density Nt=Lt =P
i nit=
P
i `it is unresponsive to changes in the number of physicians, nit,
within any individual region. The absence of direct spillovers, as by (i), and
the absence of sizeable spillovers through changes in the aggregate supply of
physicians as a possible determinant of the outside utility wt, as by (ii),22
then implies that the number of physicians within each region i is determined
independently from the development in any other region i0 6= i:23 Given the
21The multiplicative separability of life-cycle utility wt into an income stream, vt; and
a stream of non-monetary benets, ut; may appear restrictive. It can be shown, however,
that a life-cycle utility function of the form wt = yt `tnt (but) + E yt+1 `t+1nt+1 (but+1), in
which income and non-monetary utility combine period by period leads to an equivalent
allocation and ultimately to structural equation (10) under the same set of assumptions
(A4)-(A8). A proof is available from the authors on request.
22If physicians can be ranked in terms of their outside opportunities, we have wt =
! (Nt=Lt; t) ; where Nt=Lt =
P
i nit=
P
i `it denotes the number of physicians per capita at
aggregate level. While assuming that !Nt=Lt  0 then implies an upward-sloped (inverse)
supply function, we maintain that regions are "atomistic" such that isolated changes in
nit do not bear on the supply price.
23In our empirical analysis we take into account the scope for (unobserved) cross-
sectional spillovers and follow Driscoll and Kraay (1998) in calculating error terms that
are robust with regard to contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation.
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absence of cross-regional e¤ects, we continue to omit the regional index i for
the remainder of this section.
Writing the expected life-cycle income in period t as a function of the
total number of practising physicians, nt, in period t and the expected num-
ber of physicians nt+1 in period t+1; respectively, physicians would continue
to enter a particular region as long as vt (nt; nt+1) > vt, i.e. as long as the
expected discounted life-cycle income exceeds the reservation income. As-
suming the absence of entry restrictions, a period t entry equilibrium is then
given by the number of physicians nt that satises vt (n

t ; nt+1) = vt:
24 How-
ever, it is not clear a priori whether physician turnover by entry and/or exit
leads to an adjustment towards the equilibrium number of physicians nbt in
all periods. Disequilibrium situations may arise from constraints on both
entry and exit. Under a binding entry restriction the number of practising
physicians falls short of the equilibrium number, such that nbt = n < nbt and
vbt  n; nbt+1 > vbt  nbt ; nbt+1 = vbt. Conversely, the presence of sunk costs may
lead to a situation where physicians do not exit the market before their retire-
ment although the number of practising physicians exceeds the equilibrium
number, implying that nbt = n > nbt and vbt  n; nbt+1 < vbt  nbt ; nbt+1 = vbt.
We will, thus, derive the equilibrium supply nt of physicians in some
period t, depending on whether or not physician supply adjusts to changes
in the regional environment in the subsequent period t + 1: Specically, we
assume that physicians face uncertainty at time t as to whether or not an
entry equilibrium in period t + 1 will be realized. Let s 2 [0; 1] denote the
probability a physician assigns in period t to facing a disequilibrium in period
t+ 1 and let
 t+1 2
( 
1; nt+1=n

t

for nt+1=n

t > 1
nt+1=n

t ; 1

for nt+1=n

t < 1
(4)
denote the extent of adjustment towards the equilibrium value nt+1 in a
disequilibrium situation. The expected income per resident in period t + 1
24Stability is readily veried, as @vt=@nt =  yt
 
`t=n
2
t

< 0. For simplicity, we ignore
the integer issue.
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can then be written as
E

yt+1
`t+1
nt+1

= syt+1
`t+1
 t+1n

t
+ (1  s) yt+1 `t+1
nt+1
with  t+1n

t denoting the number of physicians in period t + 1 in a disequi-
librium situation.
Assume that the discount factor  is su¢ ciently small such that
 <
1
(1  s) vt+1=vt (A2)
is satised.25 In Appendix A1, we then prove the following:
Proposition 1 (i) Within an entry equilibrium at time t the number of
physicians per capita is (approximately) given by
nt
`t

yt + syt+1
`t+1
 t+1`t
vt   (1  s) vt+1 : (5)
(ii) Expected restrictions to entry (exit) in period t+1 imply an over-supply
(under-supply) of physicians in period t relative to the supply n

t
`t
js=0 =
yt
vt vt+1 that is supported by the current economic and demographic struc-
ture, i.e. nt+1 =  t+1n

t < (>)n

t+1 , n

t
`t
js>0 > (<) n

t
`t
js=0 :
According to part (i) of the Proposition, the equilibrium number of physicians
per capita at time t always increases with the income yt per resident in this
period and decreases with the reservation income vt at the point of entry.
The extent to which the (prospective) income yt+1 per resident in period t+1
determines the number of physicians in period t depends on the expectation
about whether or not the number of physicians in period t+1 will adjust to its
equilibrium value. In case it does with certainty such that s = 0, surprisingly
perhaps, the prospective income has no bearing on the current number of
physicians per capita. This is because the income stream in period t + 1
is fully o¤set by adjustments in the equilibrium number of physicians, nt+1:
25From our estimations we obtain s  0:481 (see Section 5.4) and vt+1=vt < 1:121 (see
Table 5, row (8)). Hence, (1  s) vt+1=vt < 1: Given that we may reasonably assume that
  1; the inequality in (A2) is satised.
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For a physician pondering entry at period t this implies that the discounted
value of the income stream during the second period of her working life
equals approximately the discounted value of the reservation income vt+1 at
t + 1: Thus, while the number of physicians per capita nt=`t increases with
this value, it is no longer responsive to the income stream in period t + 1.
Any expected increase in demand, for instance, is o¤set by a corresponding
increase in the number of rivals.
If, in contrast, physician supply adjusts only partially such that s = 1;
then the current number of physicians nt increases with the discounted level
of prospective income yt+1 and with the growth in the list size
`t+1
 t+1`t
=
`t+1=nt+1
`t=nt
= 1 + g
`=n
t+1 (6)
under incomplete adjustment. Since 1 + g`=nt+1 =
1+g`t+1
1+gnt+1
; with g`t+1 and g
n
t+1
denoting the growth rates of the population ` and the number of practitioners
n, respectively, it is easy to see then that population change has an impact on
the current number of physicians per capita if and only if there is imperfect
adjustment to the entry equilibrium.
According to part (ii) of the Proposition, future entry restrictions are
anticipated in the current supply of physicians. An entry restriction in pe-
riod t + 1 implies excessive list size growth relative to a situation of perfect
equilibrium adjustment.26 The expectation of this then triggers additional
entries in period t beyond the number of physicians per capita that would be
supported by the current economic and demographic structure. The converse
is true if exit restrictions lead to an excessive shrinking of the list size for a
declining population.
4.2 Structural Equation and Hypotheses
While our theoretical results for the two-period model are entirely general in
qualitative terms, they imply a period length of around 20 years. This is, of
course, an abstraction from reality, where turnover in the physician market
takes place at a higher rate and is typically measured in yearly intervals.
26This is readily checked when setting  t+1 < n

t+1=n

t in (6).
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Accordingly, our data are based on yearly observations, stretching over a
period of 15 years. Hence, our structural equation should be based on a
period length of 1 year. When deriving Proposition 1 in Appendix A1, we
consider a general set-up, where a representative physician practises for 1+z;
with z  1; periods after which she retires or leaves the region/profession for
other reasons.
Dening gyit+1 := yit+1=yit 1 and gvit+1 := vit+1=vit 1 as the growth rate
of the (expected) income earned per resident and of the reservation income,
respectively, and assuming27
  min
n
s 1;

(1  s)  1 + gvit+1 1o ; (A2)
z  1; (A3)
we can show that the equilibrium number of physicians per capita in region
i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig at time t is approximated by
nit
`it

yit
h
1 + s
 
1 + gyit+1
 
1 + g
`=n
it+1
i
vit

1  (1  s)   1 + gvit+1 ; s 2 [0; 1] ; (7)
which is equivalent to equation (5) in Proposition 1. Intuitively, the two-
period model constitutes a good approximation of the general 1 + z period
model whenever there is (i) a su¢ cient extent of discounting, implying that
e¤ects of a changing practice income associated with the expectation of entry
constraints in a period bt > t + 1 are valued at a factor (s)bt t small enough
to be of second order; and (ii) a su¢ cient duration of the remaining working
life z, implying that changes to physician income after the retirement of the
current entrants can be disregarded.
In preparation of our empirical analysis, we can then transform (7) into
a structural equation and formulate hypotheses about the determinants of
regional physician supply. To this end, dene
27By x () y we denote that x is much smaller (larger) than y:
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 (ri) : =
[y (3; ri)  y (2; ri)]
y (2; ri)
; (8)
 (ri) : =
[y (1; ri)  y (2; ri)]
y (2; ri)
; (9)
and assume
gyit+1 ! 0; (A4)
gvit+1  gv; (A5)
uit  ui (A6)
 (ri)it +  (ri)it  1; (A7)
 it =
Q
h  it (controlhit)
h ;  i; t > 0: (A8)
Assumption (A4) implies that the expected income a physician earns per
resident does not vary too much between periods; (A5) implies that the
growth rate of the outside utility, reecting e.g. exogenous supply trends,
is approximately constant over time and across regions; (A6) implies that
the benet from regional amenities is approximately constant over the time
span under consideration; (A7) implies that the weighted sum of the age
shares is su¢ ciently smaller than one; (A8) implies that the income shifters
(= region-time specic control variables) follow a Cobb-Douglas function.
Based on these assumptions, we derive in Appendix A2 the following
structural equation28
ln

nit
`it

= 0 + i + t +  (ri)it +  (ri)it + 
0

1 + g
`=n
it+1

+
P
h h ln (controlhit) (10)
28In the course of our empirical analysis, we verify that the key assumptions (A2),
(A4) and (A7) are compatible with our estimation results.
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with
0 : =   ln

1  (1  s)   1 + gv ;
i : = ln y (2; ri) + ln  i + lnui;
t : = ln t   lnwt;
0 : = s:
Hence, the logarithm of the number of physicians per capita depends on (i) a
region-xed e¤ect i; (ii) a time trend t; (iii) the short-run e¤ects of the age-
shares according to the coe¢ cients  (ri) and  (ri); (iv) the growth factor
in period t+ 1 of the average list size according to the coe¢ cient 0; and (v)
a number of logarithmic control variables. The region-xed e¤ect embraces
in particular the impact of (region-specic) protability y (2; ri) of a member
of the population aged 2059 living in a region with a degree of rurality
ri, a region-specic impact on demand  i; and the benet ui from residing
within a region i.29 The time trend relates in particular to physician income,
reecting changes in the level of demand or adjustments in reimbursement, as
well as to the trend in the outside utility of becoming a physician, including
changes in aggregate supply.30
The coe¢ cients on the age shares  (ri) and  (ri) measure the percent-
age change in protability if a member of the population 60plus or 19minus,
respectively, is treated rather than a member of the age group 2059. Obvi-
ously, the sign of these coe¢ cients is positive if and only if the treatment of
old or young members of the population is more protable than the treatment
29Alternatively to (A6), we could assume that the benet from regional amenities uit =Q
k ui (controlkit)
k depends on a set of time-variant control variables. Following through
the derivation in Appendix A2, we would then obtain i := ln y (2; ri)+ln i+lnui and an
additional term
P
k k ln (controlkit) in (10). Some of the control variables we are using
(e.g. GDP per capita, share of foreigners, share of school leavers with higher education
qualications, tourist accommodation per 100,000 population, share of in-commuters in
total employment) are then reecting both time-variant regional amenities and demand
shifters. We would maintain, however, that our main variables of interest, the age shares
and list size growth, are predominantly working through the income channel.
30Note that from an econometric perspective, the impact in the aggregate supply of
physicians per capita (across all regions), Nt=Lt, is e¤ectively indistinguishable from the
"pure" time trend t: Indeed, we nd in our data that both the Nt=Lt and the lagged
value Nt 1=Lt 1 are perfectly correlated with the time trend in our data. We therefore
do not include measures of aggregate supply as distinct controls.
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of middle-aged persons.
We have argued earlier that this is likely to depend on whether a region
is urban or rural as well as on the extent to which di¤erences according to
age and location in the protability of treating individuals are balanced out
(or magnied) through the payment system. To illustrate the relationship,
we express the expected income from providing services to a resident of a
type-ri region who belongs to age group a as
y (a; ri) =  (a; ri)  (a; ri) ;
where  (a; ri) and  (a; ri) measure the expected demand for services and
the average mark-up on the provision of services to patients aged a within
a type-ri region, respectively. The latter can be written as,  (a; ri) :=P
k x (a; ri; k) (a; ri; k), with
P
k x (a; ri; k) = 1, and amounts to a weighted
average of the mark-up  (a; ri; k) = p (a; ri; k) c (a; ri; k) on a set of specic
services; with p (a; ri; k) and c (a; ri; k) denoting the unit fee and unit cost for
the provision of service k to a member of age group a in a region of type ri:
As is readily seen age and regional type then impact on the average mark-up
through variations in the service mix, i.e. the shares x (a; ri; k) ; as well as
through the structure of the fees and costs for the various services.
Writing the coe¢ cient of the age-share 60plus as
 (ri) =
y (3; ri)
y (2; ri)
  1 =  (3; ri)
 (2; ri)
 (3; ri)
 (2; ri)
  1;
we see that the provision of health care to the population 60plus is rela-
tively protable if they demand more services (to su¢ cient extent), such
that (3;ri)
(2;ri)
> 1, or if the provision of services to them commands a (su¢ -
ciently) higher average markup, such that (3;ri)
(2;ri)
> 1: The average mark-up
for the provision of services to the population above 60 tends to be larger
if they consume larger shares of protable services and/or if they command
a larger mark-up on a given set of services. The latter depends on the ex-
tent to which fees are adjusted to reect di¤erences in treatment costs across
age groups and regional context. A similar argument applies for the relative
protability of the age group 19minus, as given by  (ri) :
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Given the lack of detailed data on both the (a; ri)-specic demand for
services and the (a; ri)-specic average mark-up, we directly estimate the
relative protability of the di¤erent age groups depending on regional type.
To this end, we let  (ri) =  + ri and  (ri) =  + ri, respectively, where
ri and ri are dummy variables depending on a regions type ri: In line
with our data, we consider three regional types ri 2 fI; II; IIIg ; the roman
numbers reecting increasing levels of rurality. Using the most urban type
of region as reference, we let I = I = 0, implying that  and  measure
the impact of the age shares within metropolitan areas.
While in principle our model allows for a general set of predictions, the
previous argument has shown that the relative protability of di¤erent pop-
ulation groups depends on both regional context and the reimbursement
scheme (as well as on other features of the health care system). Where
relevant, we therefore formulate our hypothesis against the specic context
of the provision of GPs services in Germany, 19952009.
H1  < 0 for GPs who are the focus of our empirical analysis.
The rst hypothesis is easily related. Recall from part (ii) of Observation 2
in Section 3.1 that in Germany, the age group 19minus is typically served
by paediatricians or other specialists, leaving little demand for GPs, so that
y (1; r) y (2; r) in (9), which implies the negative sign. As the population
aged 19minus is unprotable relative to the middle-aged population, a greater
share t will ceteris paribus lower a GPs expected income.
H2 (a)  > 0: (b) III < II < 0:
As we have argued earlier, the impact of the population share 60plus on
the supply of physicians depends on the regional make-up as well as on the
extent to which the reimbursement system adjusts for age- and location-
related di¤erences in the demand and mix for treatments and their costs.
Register data of a large statutory health insurer (AOK), covering about a
third of the German population, shows for the year 2008 that both utilization
of ambulatory care and per capita spending on ambulatory care tend to
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increase over the age-range 1980 (Gerste 2012). Although receding for the
highest ages, both utilization and spending are unambiguously higher for
patients drawn from the age group 60plus as opposed to the age group 20
59.31 Part (i) of Observation 1, according to which a large part of a GPs
reimbursement is not adjusted for patient age nor for practice location, then
suggests an ambivalent e¤ect: While we would expect the population 60plus
to exhibit a larger demand as opposed to the middle age-group, whether
or not the mark-up on services towards this age-groups is higher or lower
crucially depends on the mix of services and on their cost. Unfortunately, we
have no data on how these vary with age and with the degree of location.
A reading of the literature suggests there may be a regional gradient to
the relative protability of the population share 60plus: Specically, we con-
jecture that while a greater share of the elderly population raises physician
income and, thus, the per-capita number of physicians, in metropolitan re-
gions (ri = I),32 this e¤ect is diminished, and possibly reversed, in more
rural regions (ri 2 fII; IIIg). While we thus assume that y (3; I) > y (2; I),
more elderly populations may be less protable in rural settings for at least
two reasons. First, while longer travelling times generally restrict the access
to services and, thus, e¤ective demand within rural regions in general (e.g.
Dusheiko et al. 2002, Arcury et al. 2005, Iversen and Kopperud 2005, Thode
et al. 2005), this e¤ect is typically more pronounced for the elderly (Chaix
et al. 2005, Ono et al. 2014).33 Second, the provision of services to an
older patient may be relatively less protable within a rural area. Arcury et
al. (2005) show that the composition of physician services consumed by an
individual switches from preventive and chronic care to acute care as travel
distance/time increases. In particular, home visits and out-of-hours care are
prone to play a much larger role in rural environments.34 On the one hand,
31These observational ndings are conrmed by regression analysis by Jürges (2009),
based on individual data, and Kopetsch and Schmitz (2014), based on district-level data.
According to these studies the utilization of o¢ ce-based physician services tends to increase
with age from middle ages onwards as well as with various indicators of bad health or
medical need.
32Since I = 0; we then must have  > 0:
33This does not rule out that elderly people have a higher demand for GP services in
all areas. The focus here is on the relative e¤ect of rurality.
34In 1994, the share of home visits in all face-to-face consultations made up 9 percent
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home visits are much more frequent both amongst the elderly as opposed to
the middle-aged population and within rural regions (e.g. Aylin et al., 1996;
Straand and Sandvik, 1998; Boerma and Groenewegen, 2001; Giu¤rida and
Gravelle, 2001). On the other hand, home visits are typically less protable
than o¢ ce-based services (Boerma and Groenewegen, 2001). We would then
expect an increasing degree of rurality to lower the prots earned on treating
an elderly as opposed to a middle-aged population because the composition
of services is shifted towards the relatively unprotable home visits, and in
particular so among the elderly. Furthermore, longer travelling times within
rural regions tend to lower the protability of home visits and, thus, the prof-
itability of the service that has a high incidence among elderly patients. The
lack of regional adjustments in the reimbursement of o¢ ce-based physicians
[see Observation 1, part (ii)] suggests that these arguments apply very well
to Germany.35
H3 0 > 0 if and only if the adjustment to equilibrium is incomplete across
a su¢ cient number of regions.
A signicant positive coe¢ cient on list size growth implies that there must be
restrictions to equilibrium adjustment within a substantial number of local
physician markets. Here, an estimate 0 = s > 0 is reecting both the
expected or average degree of adjustment s 2 [0; 1] across all regions and the
discount factor. From Observation 3 we would, indeed, expect an interior
level of 0 < s < 1 for Germany due to the presence of partial entry controls.
We can gain further leeway by using information on whether or not spe-
cic regions were classied as exhibiting "excess supply" in period t and
should therefore have been subject to (unobservable) entry controls in pe-
riod t + 1. More specically, we estimate a version of the model, with the
in Germany (Marshall, 1996).
35In 2002 a (scheduled) home visit was reimbursed in Germany at the same point value
(300) as an (intensive) diagnostic and therapeutic consultation < 30 min. An emergency
home visit was reimbursed at 600 points and, thus, at the same level as a consultation
> 30 min (see Busse and Riesberg; 2004: table 30). Given the travel and time costs
involved with a home visit, this suggests that an o¢ ce-based provision is more protable.
Furthermore, as the reimbursement value of home visits does not increase with travelling
time/distance, we would expect the protability of this service to decline with the level of
rurality.
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coe¢ cient on list-size growth, 1+g`=nit+1; given by it = 
0+00sit; where sit = 1
if there was excess supply in region i at time t and sit = 0 otherwise. From
this, we obtain the additional hypothesis:
H3 00 > 0.
If an entry ceiling in period t+ 1 imposes a restriction on the adjustment of
physician supply, this should imply that list size growth in period t + 1 is
anticipated in a greater supply of physicians in period t. Note, however, that
we cannot rule out it = 
0 > 0 for regions which are not subject to regulatory
entry restrictions (sit = 0); as equilibrium adjustment may be limited for
non-regulatory reasons. Nevertheless, the impact of list size growth should
be stronger for regions which are (potentially) subject to regulatory entry
ceilings.
The coe¢ cients h on the control variables measure the e¤ects of the
prot shifters. Here, population density (residents per square kilometer),
and the numbers of internists and paediatricians per capita, respectively, are
of particular interest.
H4 popdens < 0:
According to theoretical models of spatial competition (e.g. Salop 1979,
Gravelle 1999, Nuscheler 2003) the intensity of competition tends to increase
with population density.36 For the particular case of Germany and over the
period of our observation, this may well have come in the form of "treadmill
competition" with the provision of additional services eroding the revenue
of all physicians due to budget-balancing reductions in the fee across the
board (Benstetter and Wambach 2006). With competition thus leading to
36Gravelle (1999) considers a set-up where ` (potential) patients are uniformly distrib-
uted around a circle of circumference K; implying a population density `=K at each point
of the circle. Physicians who locate (symmetrically) around the circle then compete for
the marginal set of patients, as given by `=K: The higher the density the more patients can
thus be gained by a marginal reduction in the fee charged or, equivalently, by a marginal
increase in quality. Put in di¤erent terms, the demand elasticity tends to be larger in more
densely populated areas (Salop 1979). In equilibrium, this leads to lower prices and/or
higher quality and to lower operating prot.
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an erosion of income, more densely populated areas sustain fewer competitors
for a given population size.
H5 intern_pc < 0:
It is well-known from Newhouse et al. (1982) that the supply of GPs is
negatively correlated with the supply of internists, as these two groups are
providing substitute services. This implies hypothesis H5.37 Recall from
part (i) of Observation 2 that this is all the more true as in Germany a
signicant share of internists have joined GPs in taking on a function of
"family practitioner".
H6 paed_pc > 0:
The role of paediatricians is less clear-cut. A priori, one might expect a
negative correlation between the supply of paediatricians and the supply of
GPs, as they are also providing substitute services. However, in contrast to
internists, the competition between GPs and paediatricians is concentrated
on the age group 19minus alone, implying that this e¤ect would be compara-
tively weak from a population perspective. Note that this is in line with our
assertion that GPs are only making comparatively low prots based on the
treatment of members of the population aged 19minus, y (1; r)  y (2; r).
In light of this, a good provision of paediatric services may rather be an in-
dicator of regional attractiveness, especially for young GPs who are in the
process of choosing a practice location within a family-friendly environment.
And this is what we hypothesize in H6.
We conclude by noting that the e¤ects relating to internists and paedia-
tricians should not be interpreted as causal, as the supply of all three groups
of physicians is typically determined simultaneously.
37From Newhouse et al. (1982) it is also known that the supply of internists tends
to increase with population density. Note, however, that as we are controlling for both
population density and for the number of internists per capita, the coe¢ cients popdens < 0
and intern_pc < 0 report the appropriate partial e¤ects (holding the respective other
factor constant).
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5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Data
We build our empirical analysis on regional panel data provided by the Fed-
eral O¢ ce for Civil Engineering and Regional Development (BBR) as part
of the INKAR data set. This data covers 412 districts (Kreise) in Germany
(corresponding to NUTS III level) over the time span 19952009. Due to
the unbalanced structure of the data matrix and the calculation of further
variables (growth rates, leads) we consider in our regressions 409 districts
and the period 19972008.
We use the number of SHI-a¢ liated GPs per 1000 residents at district
level as our dependent variable.38 We focus on GPs as they constitute a large
and homogeneous group of physicians who practise mostly independently
from particular features of a district, such as the presence or absence of a
hospital, and are not subject to speciality-specic payment arrangements
and regulations. GPs typically provide services to a very local population,
implying that cross-district spillovers are of little relevance.39 Finally, they
are less prone to be subject to regulatory entry ceilings [see Observation 3,
part (i) in Section 3.1], implying that we should observe su¢ cient variation
in the endogenous variable.
Demographic change may bear on the supply of physicians by way of
changes to both the age structure and the size of the population (Hypotheses
H1H3). We approximate the age structure by including both the population
share of people 60 years and older (60plus) and the population share of people
under 20 years (19minus). In order to test Hypothesis H2 that the impact of
age structure on physician supply may depend on the districts character, we
interact both age groups (60plus and 19minus) with an index of rurality, as
provided by the BBR. This index is subaggregated into metropolitan districts
38As we have outlined in footnote 7, around 95% of GPs hold an SHI-a¢ liation. With
the INKAR dataset containing the universe of SHI-physicians, we are condent our data
covers around 95% of all GPs.
39According to a simulation analysis based on utilization data for German ambulatory
health care, 71.5% of the German population visit the GP closest to their residential
location (Fülöp et al. 2011). Similar ndings apply for the Nehtherlands and Belgium
(Schaumans and Verboven 2008).
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(type I), municipalized districts (type II), and rural districts (type III). The
advantage of this index is that it aggregates information on population and
possible spillover e¤ects from supraregional cities.40
Unfortunately, we are lacking data about the reimbursement schedule as
an important intermediary between population structure and regional char-
acter as drivers of physician supply. Recalling from part (ii) of Observation
1 that fees are determined at state level without further adjustments to dis-
trict features, we include state-year e¤ects in our estimation, which control
for variation in the fees across states and over time.41 Another important de-
terminant of income is the share of population with private health insurance.
Lacking data on the distribution of insurance status among the population
at district level, we would assume this to be picked up by the district-xed
e¤ects and possibly by the variable on income per capita at district level,
which we conjecture to be positively related to the share of the privately
insured.42
According to Hypothesis H3, the growth factor of the average list size
within a district constitutes a crucial measure for the extent to which the
future development of practice income has a bearing on the current supply
of physicians. We thus include in our estimation the list size growth factor
advanced by one period. According to the extended Hypothesis H3, the
interaction between list size growth and a measure of regulatory entry ceilings
should have an additional positive impact. Unfortunately, district-level data
are available neither on the presence of entry closures (by specialty) nor on
exceptional permissions. We can, however, construct from the data a dummy
40Type I districts are dened by more than 300,000 inhabitants or a population density
of at least 300 inhabitants/km2. Type II districts are dened by a population density
of at least 150 inhabitants/km2 or at least 100,000 inhabitants and a population density
of at least 100 inhabitants/km2. Type III districts are dened by a population density
of at least 150 inhabitants/km2 with less than 100,000 inhabitants or at least 100,000
inhabitants and a population density of less than 100 inhabitants/km2.
41As we have detailed in Section 3.1, the 2007 and 2011 health care reforms should not
have a bearing on our estimation except for the year 2009, when the morbidity adjustment
of budgets at state level was rst introduced. Any impact this may have had would be
captured by the state-year e¤ect.
42Recent cross-sectional studies by Sundmacher and Ozegowski (2016) and Vogt (2016)
employ a constructed measure of the share of the privately insured in the year 2010. We
cannot use this particular variable in our panel analysis, as it is perfectly correlated with
the district-xed e¤ects.
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variable for each district at each point in time, which is set to one when the
criterion of "excess supply" is satised and set to zero otherwise. As discussed
previously, "excess supply" is dened by the number of physicians per capita
in a district exceeding 110 percent of a benchmark value (by specialty and
district type). We take the benchmark values for family doctors (Hausärzte)
as reported in Klose and Rehbein (2011, Table 2).43 One complication is
that the category "family doctors" for which an excess supply of doctors
is determined includes GPs and family-oriented internists as a sub-category
of all internists. Unfortunately, for our observational period 19952009, we
neither have data on the number of family doctors nor on the number of
family-oriented internists. For this reason, we are unable to construct in a
precise way the indicator for "excess supply" and resort to considering an
upper and a lower bound: For the upper bound, we contrast the number
of "GPs plus all internists" per capita against the benchmark for family
doctors, implying that we are establishing "excess supply" in more cases
than there were in reality. For the lower bound, we contrast the number of
GPs per capita against the benchmark for family doctors, implying that we
are assigning "excess supply" to fewer cases than there were in reality. In
section 5.3, we present estimation results for both proxies and show that they
do not di¤er much.
In order to test Hypothesis H4, we directly control for population den-
sity. Finally, in order to account for the interrelation between GPs and in-
ternists (Hypothesis H5) and paediatricians (Hypothesis H6), we employ the
per-capita numbers of internists and paediatricians at district level as con-
trol variables. The remaining set of control variables comprises: GDP per
capita in 1,000 e, share of foreigners within the population, share of school
leavers with higher education entrance qualication, tourist accommodation
per 100,000 population, and the share of in-commuters within total employ-
ment, all variables taken at district level. These variables allow us to control
for other time-varying impacts on physician density, as may be transmitted
both through income and through the non-pecuniary benets from taking up
43Note that the values are reported as "residents per physician" and, thus, need to be
inverted.
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practice within a district.44 Table 1 provides a summary of the variables we
employ.
Table 1 about here
5.2 Demographic and Geographic Determinants of GP
Supply: Estimation and Results
We now proceed to establish for a representative district the empirical rela-
tionship between the number of GPs per capita on the one hand, and the
demographic and geographic make-up of the district on the other. In this
section, we present ndings for a model in which we do not yet account for
the role of the "excess supply" criterion, deferring this analysis to the fol-
lowing Subsection 5.3. Following the structural equation (10), the general
specication of our panel data model for GP supply is
ln

nijt
`ijt

= 0 +  ijt + IIruralIIijijt + IIIruralIIIijijt
+ijt + IIruralIIijijt + IIIruralIIIijijt + 
0
listgroijt+1
+1 ln popdensijt + 2 ln intern_pcijt + 3 ln paed_pcijt
+
HX
h=4
h ln controlhijt +
X
j
jtBjt + i + ijt (11)
with i = 1; 2; :::; I districts, j = 1; 2; :::; J states and t = 1; 2; :::; T peri-
ods. Here, ln
 
nijt=`ijt

denotes the logarithm of the number of GPs per
capita, while ijt and ijt denote the population share 60plus and share
19minus, respectively, the reference group being the share 2059. The terms
ruralIIij  ijt and ruralIIIij  ijt measure the interaction of the popula-
tion share 60plus with the rurality levels II (municipalized districts) and III
(rural districts), a metropolitan district being the reference type. Analogous
44Unfortunately, the INKAR dataset does not include data on the gender composition
of the population nor on morbidity indicators. Therefore, and in line with other (even
just cross-sectional) studies using this data (e.g. Scholz et al. 2015, Sundmacher and
Ozegowski 2016, Vogt 2016), we are unable to control for these e¤ects.
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notation applies to the interaction of rurality with the population share 19mi-
nus. The variable listgroijt+1 denotes the growth factor of the average list
size advanced by one year, popdensijt is the population density, intern_pcijt
and paed_pcijt are the numbers of internists and paediatricians per capita,
respectively, and controlhijt is a vector of h = 4; 5; :::; H additional control
variables. Furthermore, djt are state-year e¤ects, i are district-xed e¤ects,
and ijt is an error term. The term jt captures general time trends in the
supply of GPs and variation in reimbursement that is determined at the state
level (with Bjt denoting the corresponding dummies). Recall that German
states (Bundesländer) comprise a whole number of districts (Kreise).
We calculate standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and
to contemporaneous cross-sectional correlations in the error terms, following
Driscoll and Kraay (1998). According to these authors spatial correlations
among cross-sections may arise for a number of reasons, ranging from observ-
able common economic shocks to unobserved contagion or neighbourhood
e¤ects.
Table 3 provides di¤erent specications of Equation (11).45 Our preferred
specications are (4) and (5).46 In regressions (5), (7), (9), and (11) we con-
sider the interaction of the population shares with the dummies for type II
and III districts, respectively. In regressions (6) and (7) we omit the ad-
ditional controls, while in regressions (8) and (9) we exclude the numbers
of internists and paediatricians per capita. In regressions (10) and (11) we
exclude both sets of variables in order to assess their role in shaping the rela-
tionship between the demographic and geographic variables and GP supply.
Table 3 about here
For all regressions we nd that a higher share of the elderly population
a¤ects the number of GPs per capita positively. The additional interactions
with rurality levels II and III show, however, that the positive e¤ect of the
45In Table 3 we also provide the results of the Maddala-Wu panel data unit root test.
Although the test clearly rejects the null hypothesis, we should not overrate this because
of the relatively short time frame 19972008. Complete results are available upon request.
46See Table 7 in Appendix C for the complete set of results from regressions (4) and
(5), including the full set of control variables. As none of the additional control variables
were signicant we refrain from commenting on their sign.
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population share 60plus on the number of GPs per capita is particularly
pronounced for metropolitan districts. This relationship is weakened and
eventually overturned for increasingly rural districts. For our preferred spec-
ication with interactions, regression (5), the total e¤ect of the share 60plus
(0.896-0.999) is now negative in rural districts (type III). The nding that
an elderly population becomes progressively less attractive for more rural
districts is supported by all regressions with interaction e¤ects. Recall that
the coe¢ cient on the share 60plus (including where relevant the interaction
terms) can be directly interpreted as the expected protability of providing
services to the elderly as opposed to the middle-aged population from a rep-
resentative physicians point of view. While the provision of services to a
member of the population 60plus is 1.896 times as protable as the provision
to a member of the population 2059 within a metropolitan district, it is only
.897 times as protable in a rural environment. Thus, our ndings lend sup-
port to our conjecture that rurality reduces the relative protability of the
elderly population (Hypothesis H2: (a)  > 0: (b) III < II < 0:). Rural
areas with their increasing shares of elderly inhabitants are thus exposed to
a risk of becoming under-doctored.
When considering all types of districts alike, the share of the young pop-
ulation 19minus has a signicant negative e¤ect on the supply of GPs in
regressions (4) to (7). This is in line with our Hypothesis H1 ( < 0), ac-
cording to which a large share of the population below age 20 is relatively
unprotable for GPs, as the young typically turn to paediatricians or special-
ists. When adding the interaction with rurality, we nd that the e¤ect of the
share 19minus is more pronounced within rural districts. This may hint at
an underlying expectation that young populations will not stay within rural
districts but rather migrate elsewhere, implying a reduction in the future
demand for GP services.
The growth of average list size within period t+1 is signicantly positively
related to GP supply within period t, an e¤ect we nd to be very robust
to changes in specication. This indicates that GPs are to some extent
anticipating changes in the demand for their services. Thus, we can conclude
in line with Hypothesis H3 (0 > 0) that there is a signicant degree of
imperfection in equilibrium adjustment. Recall that the coe¢ cient on the
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growth factor of average list size 
0
= s equals the product of the "average"
extent of imperfection s 2 [0; 1] and the discount factor  = (1 + ) 1 ; where
 is the discount rate. Using the relationship s = 
0
(1 + ) ; with 
0  0:481;
in our most preferred specications (4) and (5), then allows for a back-of-
the-envelope assessment of the degree of imperfection in the GP market.
Harrison et al. (2002) provide evidence from a eld experiment in Denmark
suggesting that the discount rate of the "more educated" is 0:206, which
would imply s  0:58:47 In a set of additional regressions (not reported here)
we have studied the impact of list size growth in periods t+2 and t+3: The
successively smaller coe¢ cients are consistent with the stronger discounting
of these more distant e¤ects. There is little impact on the coe¢ cients of the
other variables.48
The e¤ect of population density is signicantly negative and robust to
changes in specication. The persistent negative impact of a spatially denser
population on GP supply is in line with Hypothesis H4 (1 < 0), according to
which competition is stronger in more densely populated districts. Internists
and GPs are substitutes, a result that is robust across di¤erent specications
and in line with Hypothesis H5 (2 < 0). For paediatricians we nd a
signicant positive coe¢ cient, which we interpret as being indicative of the
attractiveness of a district in line with Hypothesis H6 (3 > 0). Regressions
(8) to (11) show that the remaining coe¢ cients change only slightly when
the two specializations are omitted, except for the share of the population
below age 20, which turns insignicant.49,50
47A similar result would obtain for the median discount rates 0:275 and 0:3 based
on recent experimental evidence for Germany (Dohmen et al. 2010). As one of their
key results, the authors show that the discount rate decreases signicantly with cognitive
ability, implying a somewhat lower value of s. Anderson et al. (2008) demonstrate that
estimates of the discount rate are substantially lower when risk aversion is controlled for
in a simultaneous estimation. Thus, the value of s reported is likely to be an upper bound.
48As list size growth may mask additional and distinct e¤ects of population growth as
opposed to the growth in the number of GPs, we have also estimated the model based on
the two distinct growth rates. Both variables have the (expected) sign that is consistent
with the positive impact of list size growth. All e¤ects are robust to this change in
specication.
49This is likely to reect that the variable is now picking up the positive impact of the
omitted share of paediatricians as an o¤setting force.
50In order to rule out any bias from potentially endogenous control variables, e.g. the
supply of internists or paediatricians, we have regressed the residuals from specication
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For robustness, we consider in Appendix B regressions with the number
of SHI-a¢ liated GPs in a district as dependent variable, treating the size of
the population as an independent variable. This specication gives rise to
very similar results.
5.3 Accounting for Entry Regulation
We now consider more explicitly the impact of regulatory entry constraints.
As outlined earlier, we have no direct information on whether or not entry
ceilings were in place within a district in any particular year. We therefore
draw on an indicator variable xsijt which is set to one if and only if district i
in state j and year t can be classied as exhibiting "excess supply" according
to the regulatory framework. Districts for which an "excess supply" has been
established can be subjected to entry ceilings, which in terms of our model
imply an upper bound to equilibrium adjustment. Note that whether or not
such a ceiling is binding depends on whether the district under consideration
still exhibits growing income prospects for physicians (or a growing attrac-
tiveness in residential terms). While we cannot observe this, we conjecture
that the presence of "excess supply" will be positively correlated with a con-
straint on future increases in the number of physicians and will, thus, imply
that future list size growth is anticipated in the current supply of physicians.
Including the interaction term 00 xsijt listgroijt+1 into (11), we can thus
hypothesize that 00 > 0 (Hypothesis H3).
As described earlier, data limitations restrict us to the construction of
either an upper bound measure uxsijt (counting both GPs and internists
against the benchmark) or a lower bound measure lxsijt (counting only GPs
against the benchmark) for the "excess supply" indicator.51 While we would
therefore view our analysis to be merely suggestive of the impacts of entry
regulation on physician supply, it nevertheless allows us to establish whether
our main results are robust to the explicit incorporation of regulatory e¤ects
(4) on the full set of explanatory variables. The analysis shows that we can rule out any
relevant correlation.
51Specically, we set uxsijt = 1 if GPs_pcijt + intern_pcijt > 1:1 benchmarkij and
uxsijt = 0 otherwise. Similarly, we set lxsijt = 1 if GPs_pcijt > 1:1 benchmarkij and
lxsijt = 0 otherwise.
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into the model.
Table 4 provides the results for the upper and lower bound measures
uxsijt and lxsijt, respectively, for the two specications with and without
the interaction between the age shares and the rurality levels. We nd the
coe¢ cient on the interaction between an "excess supply" indicator and list
size growth to be signicantly positive throughout. This conrms hypothesis
H3 that a growing demand for GP services is anticipated in the current
supply of GPs especially in those districts in which excess supply leads to
the expectation that entry restrictions are about to be introduced. This
notwithstanding, we nd a signicantly positive impact of list size growth
on current supply even for districts in which "excess supply" has not been
established. We would expect such a nding for the lower bound measure
of excess supply [specications (12) and (13)], as it fails to establish "excess
supply" for a range of districts, which may nevertheless be subjected to
entry ceilings. However, the result also holds for the upper bound measure
[specications (14) and (15)], which suggests that regulatory entry ceilings
are not the only reasons for imperfect equilibrium adjustment.
Our ndings with respect to the other variables of interest show that
despite some quantitative changes, none of the coe¢ cients change sign and
all of the relevant e¤ects remain highly signicant. We can therefore conclude
that our main results are robust to the inclusion of the "excess supply"
indicator.
Table 4 about here
5.4 Decomposing the Change in the Regional Supply
of GPs
We conclude our analysis by considering the extent to which demographic
and economic development have contributed to the change in the number of
GPs per capita over the period 19972008. Using the approximation
nt
`t

yt
h
1 + s

1 + g
`=n
t+1
i
vt [1  (1  s)  (1 + gv)] ;
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which corresponds to our structural equation (10), we obtain the relationship
n2008=`2008
n1997=`1997
=
y2008
y1997

1 + s

1 + g
`=n
2009

1 + s

1 + g
`=n
1998
  v1997
v2008
:
Thus, the growth factor of the number of GPs per capita between 2008 and
1997 can be decomposed into (a) the growth factor of income earned per
resident [rst right hand side (RHS) term], (b) a multiplier, representing
the relative contribution of the next period growth in list size (second RHS
term), and (c) the inverse growth factor of the reservation income (third RHS
term). While we can calculate the rst two terms based on our empirical
results, we will infer the growth factor of reservation income by calculating
the relationship
v2008
v1997
=
24y2008
y1997

1 + s

1 + g
`=n
2009

1 + s

1 + g
`=n
1998

35 n2008=`2008
n1997=`1997
 1
:
While the income multiplier in (b) can be directly calculated from the data
(see below), we show in Appendix A3 that
y2008
y1997
=
y
 
2008; 2008; 2008; r

y
 
1997; 1997; 1997; r

=
 
1 +
 (r)08=97 +  (r)08=97
1 +  (r)1997 +  (r)1997
!
Qhcontrolh2008controlh1997
h
; (12)
where 08=97 := 2008   1997 and 08=97 := 2008   1997, respectively.
Combining the data reported in Table 8 in Appendix C with the relevant
coe¢ cients from regression (5) in Table 3, we obtain the results reported in
Table 5. In calculating the growth factors we employ only variables for which
we have found signicant coe¢ cients. Namely, these are the age shares in the
population as well as their interaction with district type; population density;
the per capita numbers of internists and paediatricians, respectively; and the
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growth factor of average list size.52
Overall, the number of GPs per capita has declined across all district
types, the decline being most pronounced in municipalized (type II) districts
at a rate of 5.4 percent. At the same time, GP income earned per resident
has increased across all district types, the increase being at 1.8 percent in
metropolitan (type I) and municipalized (type II) districts, and at 6.4 percent
in rural (type III) districts.53
Interestingly, the change in the population age structure alone would
be supporting a stronger increase in income in the more urbanized districts,
amounting to 4.1 percent in type I districts and 2.9 percent in type II districts.
In these districts, GPsearnings increase in particular due to the growing
share of the elderly population.54 As expected, an increasing share of the
elderly population lowers income in rural districts, but this e¤ect is over-
compensated by the decline in the equally unprotable share of the young
population. Overall, we nd that population ageing has, in fact, a positive
impact on GPs earnings and cannot therefore be responsible for the decline
in the provision of GP services over our period of observation.
While the increase in population density in the metropolitan districts
tends to lower physician income by 0.8 percent, the decline in population
density in municipalized and rural districts tends to increase income. In rural
districts, this e¤ect is particularly strong, and would ceteris paribus lead to an
increase in income by 1.7 percent. This indicates that the shift in population
density from rural districts to the more urban districts has, indeed, a sizeable
impact on the competition between GPs, which is weakened, in particular,
within rural districts: A spatially more disperse population tends to stie the
incentive to attract patients through the provision of more intensive services
which come at a lower prot margin (e.g. late opening hours).
52The inclusion of either of the "excess supply" measures from regressions (13) and
(15), respectively, does not greatly change the results from our decomposition analysis.
53All of the e¤ects reported in the following can be interpreted as ceteris paribus impacts
on the number of GPs per capita. Thus, the income growth in type III districts of 6.4
percent would ceteris paribus lead to an increase in the number of GPs per capita by 6.4
percent.
54Specically, the increase in the share 60plus over the time span 19972008 tends to
increase income by some 3 percent in type I districts and by some 2 percent in type II
districts.
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The positive impact of population ageing on GP income is dampened in
all districts by the increase in the number of internists per capita. Here, the
greater provision of substitute services tends to lower income by around 2 per-
cent in all districts. Changes in the number of paediatricians per capita only
have a minor impact on GPs income prospects in all types of districts. The
positive impact of income growth over the time span 19972008 is moderately
amplied by the fact that while average list size was expected to shrink in
1998, it was expected to grow in 2009, this e¤ect adding between 0.4 percent
to the GP supply in rural districts and 0.9 percent in municipalized districts.
Based on the overall life-cycle income, the GP supply per capita should
have grown by 2.3 percent in metropolitan districts, by 2.7 percent in munic-
ipalized districts, and by 6.8 percent in rural districts. The actual decline in
the supply of GPs then implies an increase in reservation income by some 6.7
percent in metropolitan districts, by 8.6 percent in municipalized districts,
and by 12.1 percent in rural districts. A number of trends are consistent
with this nding. First, a comparison of physician income from the provision
of SHI services between the years 2009 and 2001 shows that income growth
across all specialties (and notably for internists) has outpaced the growth of
GPsincome (see Busse and Riesberg 2004 and Busse and Blümel 2014).55
This does not yet include di¤erential income growth from the provision of ser-
vices to the population with private health insurance, but we would suspect
that this would likely reinforce the increase of GPsreservation income due to
greater income growth in other medical specialties.56 Second, while Ono et
al. (2014) report an income premium of around 11 percent for GPsrural as
opposed to urban practice, this is quite possibly insu¢ cient to compensate for
a variety of disamenities within rural settings (Günther et al. 2010 and Ono
et al. 2014). These relate to working conditions, such as longer o¢ ce hours
and on-call duties within rural regions, and to the living environment, such as
55According to Busse and Blümel (2014, p. 156) around 51 percent of a GPs revenue
translates into earnings, with the same ratio being 48.8 percent across all specalities and
46.6 percent for internists. Applying these fractions to the revenue levels reported in
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 one can calculate the 2009 income levels. These can be compared in a
straightforward way to the 2001 income gures reported in Table 32 in Busse and Riesberg
(2004).
56Di¤erential income growth is also reected in the divergent supply trends of GPs as
opposed to specialists that we report in Section 3.2.
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scarcer career opportunities for the partner and less availability of child care
and leisure activities (Günther et al. 2010 and Ono et al. 2014). Based on
a stated-preference study carried out amongst a representative set of young
physicians at the point of establishing practice, Günther et al. (2010) thus
report a compensating income of around 9,000 e per month for taking up
practice in a rural as opposed to an urban environment. Evidence provided
by Ono et al. (2014) suggest that the preference gradient for urban practice
is likely to have increased over time.
Table 5 about here
6 Conclusions
We have examined theoretically and empirically how the geographical dis-
tribution of o¢ ce-based physicians, and in our empirical analysis specically
of GPs, responds to di¤erential population change at the regional level. In
doing so, we have identied a number of issues pertinent to the provision of
physician services over space and time.
First, our nding that the impact of the population share 60plus on the
supply of GPs reverses from positive within metropolitan districts to negative
within rural districts is direct evidence for the conjecture that the provision
of services to an elderly population may be relatively protable in urban
districts but not in a rural environment. While our data do not allow us
to identify the causal mechanism, this evidence is consistent with a health
care system in which the higher costs of treating elderly patients within a
rural context are not fully compensated by the payment system. As we have
argued earlier, this holds true for the German reimbursement scheme for
panel doctors before 2009 and thus for the period 19972008 covered in our
regressions. As expected, the share of the young population turns out to
be relatively unprotable from a GPs perspective in all types of districts.
Overall these ndings indicate that the positive relationship between physi-
cian supply and the share of the elderly population as frequently found in
cross-sectional studies should be interpreted with caution. A more complex
relationship emerges once due account is taken of unobserved regional het-
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erogeneity, of the full age structure of the population, and of the interaction
between geographic and demographic structure as mediated through the pay-
ment system.
Second, insofar as physicians base long-term decisions about their loca-
tion on the (expected) protability from o¤ering treatments to the resident
population, the demographic make-up of a region becomes an important de-
terminant not only of the current income but also of the expected income
from the provision of services to the future population. Population change
may then trigger "anticipatory" changes in the supply of physicians even be-
fore it actually takes e¤ect. In our empirical estimation, this implies that the
current number of GPs per capita should increase with the rate of list size
growth during the subsequent period. While we identify a statistically signif-
icant impact of anticipated list size growth on current supply, its magnitude
suggests only limited economic relevance.
In order to explain the limited role of anticipation we refer to our third
nding of interest: Expectations about future income play a role as a predic-
tor of the current number of physicians if and only if barriers to entry and/or
exit prevent the number of physicians from adjusting to its equilibrium value.
Under full equilibrium adjustment, physicians expect that changes in future
income will be o¤set by changes in the number of rival physicians in a way
that equilibrates the future income stream with the stream of reservation
income. In this case, the current supply of physicians is independent of pop-
ulation change and the evolution of other prot shifters. Thus, we would
expect anticipatory e¤ects predominantly in regions which are subject to
entry ceilings, and we can conrm this empirically: The impact of list size
growth is signicantly larger in regions that are classied as exhibiting an
"excess supply" according to regulatory rules and therefore more likely to be
subject to entry controls.
Fourth, when decomposing the change in the per-capita supply of GPs
over the time span 19972008 we nd, perhaps surprisingly, that population
ageing is contributing to an increase in physician income in all types of dis-
tricts alike. Within metropolitan and urban districts, GPs benet both from
an increase in the share of the elderly population as well as from the reduc-
tion in the share of the young population While the increase in the share of
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the elderly population is lowering GPsearnings in rural districts, this e¤ect
is compensated by the strong decline in the young population. An additional
boost to GPsearnings in rural districts arises from the fall in population
density, which can be argued to lead to less intensive competition. The in-
crease in physician income that is implied by our decomposition analysis
should ceteris paribus lead to an increase in the number of GPs per capita
in all types of districts. The fact that we observe a decline should therefore
be explained by an increasing reservation income of becoming a GP, which
is most pronounced in rural areas.
For policy-makers interested in ensuring an adequate and equitable pro-
vision of health services across regions, it is important to know whether the
supply of physicians adjusts appropriately to changes in the local demand for
services. Given that population ageing is widely expected to come with an
increased per-capita demand for ambulatory health care, our results carry a
mixed message for Germany: While an increase in the share of the elderly
population is ceteris paribus prone to induce a greater supply of GPs in
metropolitan districts, the opposite is true for rural districts. This suggests
that within rural areas the local supply of physicians may not be adjust-
ing to the needs of an ageing population. The divergent impact across the
urbanrural spectrum also suggests that the gap between an over-provision
of physicians within metropolitan areas and an under-provision within rural
areas may well be widening. For GPs, this tendency is o¤set, however, by
the decline in the share of the young population, implying that the overall
development will strongly depend on the particular pattern of the ageing
dynamics. The supply of GP services is further shaped by a shift in the
concentration of the population away from rural regions into metropolitan
and urban regions: the increase in population density within metropolitan
areas tends to depress the number of GPs per capita, whereas the decline
in population density within rural regions tends to cushion the fall in the
per-capita supply of GPs. While this dampens to some extent the widen-
ing in the urbanrural gap in the per-capita supply of GPs, the underlying
change in competition is prone to imply a greater provision at the level of the
individual physician within urban areas and a lower provision within rural
areas. Finally, our analysis shows that for the period covered by our data,
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the population-driven trends in physician supply are strongly overridden by
an opportunity- and preference-driven downward trend in the supply of GPs,
especially in rural areas. Whether or not this continues to be true in the light
of continued ageing remains to be assessed by future research.
Altogether, our ndings tie in with general concerns about regional in-
equality in the provision of health care in Germany (Fülöp et al. 2010,
Advisory Council 2014, Ozegowski and Sundmacher 2014) as well as in other
OECD countries (Cooper et al. 2002, Arcury et al. 2005, Morris et al. 2005,
Goddard et al. 2010, Ono et al. 2014). Various policy initiatives are on the
way in Germany (Advisory Council 2014, Ozegowski and Sundmacher 2014)
and elsewhere (Ono et al. 2014) to encourage physicians, and especially
GPs, to take up practice in rural areas or to o¤set a shortfall by di¤erent
arrangements of provision, including the substitution of nurse practitioners
and assistants for physicians (Stange 2014). While an evaluation of these
policy measures lies outside the scope of this paper, our results suggest that
signicant adjustments to reimbursement may be necessary in order to stabi-
lize the supply of GPs in rural areas in Germany. The level of remuneration of
GPs needs to be increased substantially in order to match the income growth
for specialists, and substantial income premia are required to stimulate entry
into rural practice. Indeed, both of these factors are recognized in recent
policy proposals (Advisory Council 2014, Ozegowski and Sundmacher 2014).
Accompanying reforms are likely to be necessary in respect to the mode of
provision. Here, the strengthening of group practices and primary care cen-
ters may both facilitate a continuous provision of care and render the working
environment more attractive, especially for young physicians who exhibit a
lesser preference for single-handed practice (Ono et al. 2014).
Our results also yield a couple of general insights. First, the nancial in-
centives that come through the reimbursement scheme should not be based
on geographic or demographic criteria in isolation when it comes to an eq-
uitable provision of services to all population groups in all regions. In case
of Germany, for instance, the negative urban-to-rural gradient in the relative
protability of the population share 60plus suggests that physician reim-
bursement should be adjusted according to both age and regional character
rather than according to one criterion alone. The 2007 and 2011 health care
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reforms have to some extent gone down this way by introducing adjustments
in the fees to the morbidity structure and to (exceptional) regional circum-
stances as well as by granting greater regional autonomy in the design of
payments (Busse and Blümel 2014). Second, policy initiatives should not
only embrace short-term incentives for physicians to settle in under-doctored
areas, but also the economic and demographic prospects which are prone to
shape the supply of physicians in the longer term. Indeed, regional popu-
lation change poses a multi-faceted challenge for health policy: population
structure interacts with geographic structure both in a static way and over
time, and this interaction is strongly shaped by the reimbursement scheme.
This opens considerable scope for future work both on the extent to which
alternative (e.g. more capitation-oriented) reimbursement schemes are con-
ducive (or not) to a provision of physician services that is equitable across
sub-populations, space and time, as well as on the characterization of an
"optimal" scheme in that respect.
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8 Appendix A
8.1 Appendix A1:
General Model and Proof of Proposition 1
We derive the equilibrium for a general multi-period model of regional physi-
cian entry and show that the results presented in Proposition 1 for the two-
period case are entirely general. Consider a set-up where a representative
physician practises for 1 + z; with z  1; periods after which she retires or
leaves the region/profession for other reasons. We focus on the physicians
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life-cycle problem within a single region. While we assume that an entry
equilibrium is realized in period t, the representative physician expects for
all subsequent periods bt 2 [t+ 1; t+ z] that physician supply does not fully
adjust to equilibrium with probability s 2 [0; 1] : Let
Ebt := ybt
"
s
`btbnbt + (1  s) `btnbt
#
then denote the expected income for period bt; where ybt = y  bt; bt; bt; r, as
given by (1), denotes the average expected income per resident at time bt, and
where `bt=nbt and `bt=nbt denote the list sizes corresponding to a disequilibrium
number of physicians bnbt and an equilibrium number nbt , respectively. Apply-
ing a discount factor  < 1, we can write the present value of the physicians
expected life-cycle income at time t as
vt =
t+zX
bt=t

bt tEbt: (13)
We continue to employ the utility function (2), where the benet from re-
gional amenities is now given by ut =
Pt+zbt=t bt tubt. Continuing to describe
the reservation income by (3) and dening Ent;z := fEnbtgt+zbt=t+1 as the set of
the expected number of physicians for the periods t+1 through t+ z; i.e. up
to retirement, an entry equilibrium is given by the number of physicians nt
that satises vt (nt ;Ent;z) = vt: Observe that in any period bt 2 [t+ 1; t+ z]
the physician supply has been in continuous disequilibrium (since the last
equilibrium point in t) with probability sbt t and express the disequilibrium
supply in period bt as nbt =  btnt ; with
 bt 2
( 
1; nbt=nt  for nbt=nt > 1 
nbt=nt ; 1 for nbt=nt < 1 (14)
denoting the extent of (partial) adjustment towards the equilibrium value nbt :
We can now derive the following result.
Proposition 1A An entry equilibrium at time t with s 2 [0; 1] and z  1
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su¢ ciently large, is (approximately) given by
nt
`t

yt +
Pt+zbt=t+1 (s)bt t ybt`bt bt`t
vt   (1  s) 
Pt+zbt=t+1 (s)bt t 1 vbt : (15)
Proof: Consider an entry equilibrium in period t and expand the expression
of a physicians life-cycle income as follows:
vt = vt (n

t ;Ent;z) =
yt`t
nt
+
t+zX
bt=t+1

bt tEbt
=
yt`t
nt
+ (1  s) 
0@yt+1`t+1
nt+1
+
t+zX
bt=t+2

bt tEbt
1A+ s
0@yt+1`t+1
 t+1n

t
+
t+zX
bt=t+2

bt tEbt
1A
=
yt`t
nt
+ (1  s) 
0@yt+1`t+1
nt+1
+
t+zX
bt=t+2

bt tEbt
1A
+s
24yt+1`t+1
 t+1n

t
+ (1  s) 
0@yt+2`t+2
nt+2
+
t+zX
bt=t+3

bt tEbt
1A+ s
0@yt+2`t+2
 t+1n

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+
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bt=t+3

bt tEbt
1A35
= :::
=
yt`t
nt
+
t+zX
bt=t+1
(s)
bt t ybt`bt
 btnt + (1  s) 
t+zX
bt=t+1
(s)
bt t 1
0@ybt`bt
nbt +
t+zX
bbt=bt+1

bbt btEbbt
1A ; (16)
where the last equality follows from a collection of all terms relating to con-
tinuing disequilibrium (the rst sum from t+1) and to a switch to equilibrium
(the second sum from t+ 1). By denition of an entry equilibrium we have
ybt`bt
nbt = vbt  
bt+zX
bbt=bt+1

bbt btEbbt:
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Inserting this into (16), we obtain
vt = vt (n

t ;Ent;z) =
yt`t
nt
+
t+zX
bt=t+1
(s)
bt t ybt`bt
 btnt
+(1  s) 
t+zX
bt=t+1
(s)
bt t 1
0@vbt   bt+zXbbt=t+z+1 
bbt btEbbt
1A
 yt`t
nt
+
t+zX
bt=t+1
(s)
bt t ybt`bt
 btnt + (1  s) 
t+zX
bt=t+1
(s)
bt t 1 vbt; (17)
where the approximation follows when noting that
Pt+zbt=t+1 (s)bt t 1Pbt+zbbt=t+z+1 bbt btEbbt =
z
P2zbt=z+1 sz sbt z 1s 1 bt z 1Et+bt approaches zero for  < 1 and z su¢ ciently
large. Solving the expression in (17) for nt=`t yields (15).
The expression reported in (5) of part (i) of Proposition 1 then follows im-
mediately when setting z = 1 in (15). The interpretation of the more general
result is analogous to the one presented for the two-period case. According to
(15), the equilibrium number of physicians per capita at time t increases with
the current income, yt; as well as with the discounted stream of income over
the physicians remaining working life that is expected for a continuing dise-
quilibrium conguration from period t+1 onward. This stream increases with
the extent of (disequilibrium) list-size growth. Notably, the discount factor
and the probability of continuing disequilibrium are compounded, implying
that future income streams would typically receive low weights.57 Conversely,
the equilibrium number of physicians per capita decreases with the current
reservation income vt and increases with the discounted stream of reservation
income over the remaining working life that is expected for a reswitching of
the market into equilibrium. Again, the reservation income in more distant
periods receives low weights due to the expectation that a reswitching of the
57Of course, there may be several spells of disequilibrium over a physicians working life.
Note, however, that any intermittent equilibrium in a period bt 2 [t+ 1; t+ z] will lead to a
replacement of the income stream over the time span
bt; t+ z with the reservation income
vbt less an adjustment term for the time span t+ z + 1;bt+ z, which in the presence of
discounting is negligible for z su¢ ciently large. Hence, conditional on an equilibrium in
period bt disequilibrium congurations for bbt 2 bt; t+ z have no bearing on the supply of
physicians in period t:
56
  
market would have occurred much earlier. Finally, note that the boundary
cases s = 0 and s = 1 follow immediately along the lines discussed in the
context of Proposition 1.
Part (ii) of Proposition 1 can be proved as follows: Evaluating (5) at
 t+1 = n

t+1=n

t and re-solving the resulting expression yields
nt
`t
s0; t+1=nt+1=nt = ytvt   (1  s) vt+1   syt+1 `t+1nt+1 
yt
vt   vt+1 =
nt
`t
js=0 ;
where the approximation follows when observing that yt+1
`t+1
nt+1
= vt+1 +
2Et+2  vt+1 under the premise that physicians will not give much con-
sideration to the income/market in period t+ 2 after their retirement.58
Furthermore, it is easy to check that sgn @
@s

nt
`t

= sgn

 
 t+1

with


 
 t+1

=
yt+1`t+1
 t+1`t
(vt   vt+1)  ytvt+1:
Note that 
0 < 0 and



nt+1
nt

=
nt
`t
yt+1`t+1
nt+1
(vt   vt+1)  ytvt+1 = yt+1`t+1
nt+1
yt  ytvt+1  0;
where the second equality follows when inserting n

t
`t
s0; t+1=nt+1=nt = ytvt vt+1
and where the approximation follows again under the presumption that
2Et+2 ! 0: Observing that nt+1 =  t+1nt 7 nt+1 implies  t+1 7 nt+1=nt ;
we obtain the result reported.
58Note that for the two period case, in which each period spans about 20 years, we will
have  << 1 such that 2 ! 0 is a reasonable assumption.
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8.2 Appendix A2:
Derivation of structural equation (10)
Taking logs of the expression in (7) gives
ln

nit
`it

= ln yit + ln
h
1 + s
 
1 + gyit+1
 
1 + g
`=n
it+1
i
  ln vit   ln

1  (1  s)   1 + gvit+1 : (18)
We can now express the rst summand on the RHS as
ln yit = ln


y (2; ri) + [y (3; ri)  y (2; ri)]it + [y (1; ri)  y (2; ri)]it
	
 it

= ln y (2; ri) + ln

1 +  (ri)it +  (ri)it

+ ln  it
 ln y (2; ri) +  (ri)it +  (ri)it + ln  it; (19)
with  (ri) and (ri) as dened in (8) and (9), respectively. Assuming (A7)
 (ri)it+  (ri)it  1; the third line then follows from a rst-order Taylor
approximation.59
The second summand on the RHS of (18) can be expressed as
ln
h
1 + s
 
1 + gyit+1
 
1 + g
`=n
it+1
i
 s  1 + gyit+1 1 + g`=nit+1  s 1 + g`=nit+1 ; (20)
where the rst approximation follows from a rst-order Taylor approximation
when assuming   s 1 as in (A2) and where the second approximation
follows when assuming gyit+1 ! 0 as in (A4).
The third and fourth summands on the RHS of (18) can be expressed as
  ln vit   ln

1  (1  s)   1 + gvit+1
=   lnwt + lnui   ln

1  (1  s)   1 + gv ; (21)
where the equality follows when observing (3) and assumptions (A5) and
(A6): Inserting (19)(21) into (18), taking account of (A8), summarizing
59The term ln

1 +  (ri)it +  (ri)it

is dened only for  (ri)it +  (ri)it   1.
This must necessarily be true. Noting (A1), it is readily veried from (8) and (9) that
min

 (ri) ;  (ri)
	   1. But then  (ri)it +  (ri)it     it + it   1:
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terms and assigning parameters, we obtain the structural equation (10) with
0 = s.
8.3 Appendix A3:
Derivation of equation (12)
It is easily veried that
y2008
y1997
=
y
 
2008; 2008; 2008; r

y
 
1997; 1997; 1997; r

=
y (2; r) + [y (3; r)  y (2; r)]2008 + [y (1; r)  y (2; r)]2008
y (2; r) + [y (3; r)  y (2; r)]1997 + [y (1; r)  y (2; r)]1997
 2008
1997
=
(
1 +
[y (3; r)  y (2; r)]08=97 + [y (1; r)  y (2; r)]08=97
y (2; r) + [y (3; r)  y (2; r)]1997 + [y (1; r)  y (2; r)]1997
)
 2008
1997
=
 
1 +
 (r)08=97 +  (r)08=97
1 +  (r)1997 +  (r)1997
!
Qhcontrolh2008controlh1997
h
;
where the second equality follows when inserting from (1); where the third
equality follows when substituting 08=97 := 2008   1997 and 08=97 :=
2008   1997, respectively; and where the fourth inequality follows when
dividing through by y (2; r) the second term in the bracelets, substituting
from (8), (9) as well as from (A8), and summarizing.
9 Appendix B
To provide further evidence for the robustness of our results, we estimate
the econometric model (11) based on absolute numbers of GPs. Typically,
the supply of physicians is measured in per-capita terms. In the presence
of interregional migration, however, the use of physicians per capita as a
dependent variable may lead to measurement error. At the regional level, it
is often observed, that younger people have a greater propensity to migrate.
Consider thus a region subject to intense emigration on the part of young
individuals. On the one hand, the corresponding decline in population size
implies a ceteris paribus decline in the number of physicians per capita. On
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the other hand, the share of older people increases, generating a positive yet
spurious correlation with the number of physicians per capita. Given that
the supply of physicians responds to changes in population size only with a
lag, a focus on the number of GPs per capita then comprises a measurement
error.
To illustrate this point more formally, we decompose the number of GPs
per capita (n=`) into a measure of real supply (S) and a measurement error
due to interregional migration (). The regression ln(n=`) = S +  =  +
X + u+  (with u as an idiosyncratic error term) that should approximate
the true model yields a biased parameter  if the explanatory variable X
is correlated with . Since a declining population boosts both the share
60plus and the number of physicians per capita at least in the short run, we
can conclude that the parameter corresponding to the share 60plus is likely
biased upwards. For this reason we provide here alternative results for the
specication (11), using the log of the number of GPs as dependent variable
while directly controlling for population size.
A comparison of the results for the number of GPs per capita (Table
3) and the (absolute) number of GPs (Table 6) shows that the bias due
to regional population mobility is very small and, indeed, negligible in the
most important regressions. Some di¤erences arise when control variables
are excluded. Overall, the results are in line with the Hypotheses H1H6
and our conclusions remain unchanged.
Table 6 about here
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10 Appendix C: All Figures and Tables
61
  
-2
0
0
20
40
60
80
ph
ys
ic
ia
ns
-60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60
general practitioners
West Germany East Germany
Figure 1: Percentage change, 19952009, in the number of physicians and
GPs at district level
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Figure 2: Correlation of population shares at district level
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Table 1: Basic Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GPs per 1000 residents (n=`) 54.027 8.5132 26.1 90
number of GPs (n) 103.89 115.96 9 1918
19minus () 0.2077 0.0251 0.1261 0.2896
60plus
 


0.2440 0.0260 0.1608 0.3340
growth of list size (listgro) 1.0059 0.0294 0.8385 1.4096
internists per 1000 residents (intern_pc) 19.929 8.8224 0.9 56.5
paediatricians per 1000 residents
(paed_pc)
6.9480 2.6215 1.3 19.2
population (`) 200358 226392 34525 3431675
population density (popdens) 525.03 670.44 38.1 4270.5
beds for tourism (per 1000 inhabitants) 38.253 51.617 1.5 614.7
share of school leavers with higher educa-
tion entrance qualication
23.559 8.2058 5.9 67
share of foreigners in population 7.2699 4.6766 0.4 26.3
share of in-commuter amongst all em-
ployed
33.872 15.017 7 90.1
GDP per capita (in 1000 e) 24.984 10.038 10.8 86.7
district type I (metropolitan) 0.3335 0.4715 0 1
district type II (municipalized) 0.4354 0.4959 0 1
district type III (rural) 0.2311 0.4216 0 1
excess supply (lower bound) 0.0372 0.1893 0 1
excess supply (upper bound) 0.7565 0.4292 0 1
Notes: The number of observations is 4890.
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Table 2: Basic statistics across district types
metropolitan
districts (type
I)
municipalized
districts (type
II)
rural districts
(type III)
GPs per 1000 population 48.167 55.243 60.196
(7.370) (6.893) (7.441)
GPs per km2 0.416 0.212 0.171
(0.440) (0.262) (0.232)
population density 884.32 378.64 282.25
(890.4) (440.5) (387.6)
60plus
 


0.242 0.243 0.249
(0.022) (0.028) (0.027)
19minus () 0.204 0.211 0.207
(0.020) (0.027) (0.027)
growth rate GPs per 1000 pop -0.041 -0.054 -0.047
(0.091) (0.089) (0.098)
growth rate GPs per km2 -0.028 -0.065 -0.080
(0.086) (0.110) (0.118)
growth rate population density 0.016 -0.012 -0.035
(0.056) (0.063) (0.071)
growth rate 60plus 0.177 0.175 0.217
(0.082) (0.080) (0.109)
growth rate 19minus -0.090 -0.133 -0.183
(0.082) (0.092) (0.125)
Notes: All values are means across districts (and time). Growth rates are calculated
between the years 1995 and 2009. Standard errors in parentheses. Type I: 1631 observations;
type II: 2129 observations; type III: 1130 observations. For growth rates we have 136 type I
districts, 180 type II districts, and 96 type III districts.
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Table 4: Regressions accounting for excess supply
Dependent variable: Log of GPs per capita
(12) (13) (14) (15)
19minus () -0.411z -0.434y -0.444z -0.563y
(0.128) (0.215) (0.104) (0.191)
19minusruralII 0.226 0.256
(0.150) (0.143)
19minusruralIII -0.717z -0.597z
(0.209) (0.179)
60plus
 


0.679z 0.883z 0.475z 0.688z
(0.063) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047)
60plusruralII -0.225z -0.294z
(0.065) (0.047)
60plusruralIII -0.860z -0.883z
(0.118) (0.072)
listgro 0.460z 0.462z 0.386z 0.388z
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022)
listgro lxs 0.057z 0.055z
(0.008) (0.008)
listgro uxs 0.062z 0.061z
(0.005) (0.006)
ln (intern_pc) -0.064z -0.065z -0.088z -0.089z
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)
ln (paed_pc) 0.032z 0.033z 0.025z 0.027z
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
ln (popdens) -0.418z -0.443z -0.478z -0.512z
(0.008) (0.011) (0.019) (0.023)
within R2 0.455 0.460 0.518 0.523
Notes: Signicance: z=1% and y=5%. Driscoll & Kraay standard
errors in parentheses, 4890 obs. Number of regions: 409. Period: 1997
2008. Controls at district level are: GDP per capita, share of foreigners
in population, share of school leavers with higher education entrance
qualication, tourist accommodation per 100,000 population, and share
of in-commuters amongst all employed. All regressions include xed
e¤ects and state-year e¤ects.
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Table 5: Decomposing changes in GP supply
metropolitan
districts (type
I)
municipalized
districts (type
II)
rural districts
(type III)
(1)
GPs_pc2008
GPs_pc1997
0.959 0.946 0.953
(2) y2008
y1997
1.018 1.018 1.064
of this due to change in
(3)...age structure 1.041 1.029 1.068
(4)...pop dens 0.992 1.006 1.017
(5)...intern_pc 0.984 0.981 0.977
(6)...paed_pc 1.002 1.002 1.002
(7)
1+(1+g`2009)
1+(1+g`1998)
1.005 1.009 1.004
(8) v2008
v1997
implied 1.067 1.086 1.121
Not: Entries in row (1) are taken from the data. Entries in rows (2)(7) are
calculated from equation (12), using relevant coe¢ cients from Table 3 and data from
Table 8. Entries in (8) follow from multiplication of the respective entries in rows (2)
and (7) and division by the entries in row (1).
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Table 7: Full results for preferred specications
Dependent variable: Log GPs per capita (4) (5)
coe¢ cient S.E. coe¢ cient S.E.
19minus () -0.452z (0.122) -0.523z (0.201)
19minusruralII 0.215 (0.139)
19minusruralIII -0.737z (0.223)
60plus
 


0.645z (0.060) 0.896z (0.046)
60plusruralII -0.342z (0.054)
60plusruralIII -0.999z (0.131)
listgro 0.481z (0.024) 0.482z (0.025)
ln (intern_pc) -0.063z (0.015) -0.064z (0.015)
ln (paed_pc) 0.034z (0.004) 0.036z (0.004)
ln (popdens) -0.447z (0.011) -0.482z (0.013)
beds for tourism (per 1000 inhabitants) 0.012 (0.008) 0.011 (0.008)
share of school leavers with higher educa-
tion entrance qualication
0.0003 (0.006) -0.002 (0.006)
share of foreigners in population -0.004 (0.011) 0.003 (0.012)
share of in-commuter amongst all em-
ployed
-0.004 (0.010) -0.003 (0.011)
GDP per capita (in 1,000 e) -0.013 (0.015) -0.015 (0.014)
within R2 0.439 0.445
Notes: Signicance: z=1% and y=5%. Driscoll & Kraay standard errors in parentheses, 4890
obs. Number of districts: 409. Period: 19972008. All controls as logarithms. All regressions
include xed e¤ects and state-year e¤ects.
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Table 8: Data for the decomposition analysis
metropolitan
districts (type
I)
municipalized
districts (type
II)
rural districts
(type III)
1997 0.219 0.220 0.221
97=08 0.0387 0.0385 0.0479
1997 0.212 0.223 0.226
97=08 -0.0189 -0.0298 -0.0415
1 + g
`=n
1998 0.993 0.988 1.000
1 + g
`=n
2009 1.009 1.016 1.013
popdens2008
popdens1997
1.016 0.988 0.965
intern_pc2008
intern_pc1997
1.284 1.352 1.428
paed_pc2008
paed_pc1997
1.045 1.068 1.044
Notes: 97=08 := 2008   1997 and 97=08 := 2008  
1997:
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